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INTRODUCTION 
 Public access to government information is one of our nation’s 
most cherished and established principles.1  Yet in times of war,2 this 
and other freedoms are often eclipsed in favor of competing 
government interests.3  Americans have come to expect a degree of 
transparency in their government:  for nearly forty years, the 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)4 has entitled the public to 
obtain certain information through mandatory government 
disclosures.  However, the United States government, with President 
                                                          
 1. In signing the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) into law, President 
Lyndon B. Johnson declared, “[t]his legislation springs from one of our most 
essential principles:  [a] democracy works best when the people have all the 
information that the security of the Nation permits.”  H. REP. NO. 104-795, at 8 
(1966), cited in Paul M. Schoenhard, Note, Disclosure of Government Information Online:  
A New Approach From an Existing Framework, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 497, 499 (2002). 
 2. President Bush commented, “[w]e’re an open society, but we’re at war . . . .  
Foreign terrorists and agents must never again be allowed to use our freedoms 
against us.”  Brad Knickerbocker, Security Concerns Drive Rise in Secrecy, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Dec. 3, 2001, at 1, cited in Schoenhard, supra note 1, at 503.  “From 
Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of the right of habeas corpus during the Civil War, to 
the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, to the surveillance of 
anti-Vietnam War protestors and civil rights leaders, we see that our freedoms and 
liberties are often sacrificed in times of conflict.”  Schoenhard, supra note 1, at 508 
(citing Adam Cohen, Rough Justice; The Attorney General Has Powerful New Tools to Fight 
Terrorism.  Has He Gone Too Far?, TIME, Dec. 10, 2001, at 30); cf. Stephen Gidiere & 
Jason Forrester, Balancing Homeland Security and Freedom of Information, 16 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 139, 139 (2002) (noting that the September 11, 2001 terrorists 
“availed themselves of the everyday freedoms that Americans take for granted,” such 
as purchasing an airline ticket over the Internet and enrolling in a pilot training 
course).  Once information is released to the public, it may eventually fall into 
terrorists’ hands.  Id. 
 3. “The goal of an informed citizenry and open government is often at odds 
with other public interests,” such as “maintaining an efficient and effective 
government,” and the “preservation of the confidentiality of sensitive information.”  
Jeffrey Norgle, Comment, Revising the Freedom of Information Act for the Information Age:  
The Electronic Freedom of Information Act, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 817, 
822 (1996) (tracing Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) developments in response 
to public needs, citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1988)).  See also Administrative Law, 
Adjudicatory Issues, and Privacy Ramifications of Creating a Department of Homeland 
Security:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 2 (2002) (statement of Rep. Watt, Member, House Comm. 
on the Judiciary) (arguing that the government’s goal of protecting its citizens “will 
involve sacrificing personal liberties”); Laura Parker et al., Secure Often Means Secret, 
USA TODAY, May 16, 2002, at 1A, 4A (reporting that “[t]he U.S. government often 
has embraced secrecy during crises,” particularly during times of war); Robert L. 
Saloschin, The Department of Justice and the Explosion of Freedom of Information Act 
Litigation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (2000) (arguing that when the public must 
be protected from “ruthless adversaries, even the perception of openness in 
government can be devastating”); Laura A. White, Note, The Need for Governmental 
Secrecy:  Why the U.S. Government Must Be Able to Withhold Information in the Interest of 
National Security, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1079 (2003) (citing Michael Kelly, Secrecy, 
Case by Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2002, at A23, and arguing that democratic ideals 
must occasionally be offended in order for the United States to maintain national 
security and freedom). 
 4. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002). 
UHL.AUTHORCHANGES2MARTINE.A.DOC 2/23/2004  2:22 PM 
264 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:261 
George W. Bush and Attorney General John Ashcroft at the helm, 
recently set in motion mechanisms that will restrict the flow of 
government information to the requesting public.5 
 As the horror of al Qaeda’s September 11, 2001 attack still haunts 
the nation’s consciousness, the U.S. remains a target for terrorist 
groups.6  Despite a massive effort to eliminate terrorist networks, 
national security experts argue that the U.S. is just as vulnerable to 
attack as it was on September 10, 2001.7  Although scattered, the al 
Qaeda network may remain capable of terrible attacks despite our 
efforts.8 
 While the U.S. government attempts to strengthen national 
security to meet this evolving threat, a re-examination of some of our 
country’s core values and principles is an entirely proper public 
response.9  In particular, one must examine whether our 
government’s high degree of transparency, though serving a valuable 
social purpose, may also provide support to terrorists.10  Although 
                                                          
 5. See discussion infra Parts II & III (reviewing FOIA developments post-
September 11, 2001). 
 6. See Dan Eggen, Risk of Terror Attack Climbs, U.S. Finds, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 
2003, at A10 (reporting senior U.S. intelligence officials’ conclusions that the risk of 
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil has increased significantly); see also THE WHITE HOUSE, 
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES 
AND KEY ASSETS 7 (2003) [hereinafter NSPPCIKA] (arguing that our enemies 
“consider terrorism an effective weapon to use against us, and they will continue to 
employ such tactics” until the U.S. can prove it is no longer effective). 
 7. See Barton Gellman, In U.S., Terrorism’s Peril Undiminished, WASH. POST, Dec. 
24, 2002, at A01, A06 (quoting a Bush insider as stating that “[w]ith untold billions 
spent—money, personnel and blood—how can we claim any kind of success if we’re 
just as vulnerable as before?”); see also COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMERICA—
STILL UNPREPARED, STILL IN DANGER 13 (2002) (reporting that a year after September 
11, America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent and respond to a terrorist 
attack on U.S. soil), available at http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Homeland_TF.pdf (on file 
with the American University Law Review).  In all likelihood, the next attack will 
result in a large number of casualties and widespread disruption to American lives 
and the economy.  Id. 
 8. Gellman, supra note 7.  As it did with box cutters and jetliners on September 
11, 2001, al Qaeda could make innovative use of ordinary technology to attack the 
U.S.  Id.  Of particular concern to security experts is the possibility of undiscovered 
“sleeper cells” on U.S. soil.  Id. 
 9. See Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After September 11, 86 MINN. L. REV. 
1115, 1116, 1124 (2002) (commenting on the expansion of “government secrecy,” 
including the denial of public access to government information post-September 11, 
2001).  In reconsidering our core freedoms, debate has swirled around FOIA 
because al Qaeda groups in Afghanistan were found with copies of General 
Accounting Office reports and other government information obtained through 
FOIA.  See 148 CONG. REC. H5828-06 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Rep. 
Davis) [hereinafter Statement of Davis] (arguing that while the United States works 
to protect national security against terrorism, “we also need to ensure that we are not 
arming terrorists”). 
 10. See, e.g., Homeland Security Efforts:  Hearing Before the House Comm. on Science, 
107th Cong. 32 (2002) (statement of James K. Kallstrom, Special Advisor to 
Governor Pataki on Counter-Terrorism) [hereinafter Statement of Kallstrom] 
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certain information disclosed under FOIA may be important for 
public safety, other information obtained through FOIA could also 
put us at risk.  In the past two years alone, public requests under 
FOIA have yielded important public safety information—from 
reports about excessive levels of mercury in canned tuna,11 to details 
about the presence of anthrax spores in Washington, D.C.’s 
Brentwood mail facility.12  However, the importance of this 
information must now be weighed against frightening new evidence 
that the U.S. military found al Qaeda groups in possession of U.S. 
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) Reports and government 
information obtained through FOIA.13  Specifically, investigators 
discovered “detailed maps and drawings of sensitive infrastructure 
locations” in caves in Afghanistan and in al Qaeda training camps.14 
 The U.S. government’s knee-jerk reaction to such evidence was to 
restrict public access to government information in the name of 
national security.15  The government accomplished this goal through 
agency guidance in new FOIA memoranda and through a broad 
FOIA exemption for the new Department of Homeland Security.  
Although these recent FOIA developments did not receive much 
attention from the mainstream news media,16 Americans will be 
shocked to realize the practical implications of losing their right to 
enjoy free and open access to government information.17 
                                                          
(arguing that new FOIA legislation must ensure that “sensitive information about 
potential threats to the Nation’s critical infrastructure” must not “fall into the wrong 
hands” and be used to attack us); THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 
HOMELAND SECURITY 56 (2002) [hereinafter NSHS] (arguing that while it is 
important to protect public access to government information, that right must be 
balanced against protecting national security). 
 11. The National Security Archive, The U.S. Freedom of Information Act at 35:  Nearly 
2 Million Requests Last Year at a Cost of One Dollar Per Citizen; National Security Archive 
Electronic Briefing Book Number 51 [hereinafter FOIA at 35], at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB51/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) 
(on file with the American University Law Review). 
 12. See Judicial Watch Files Criminal Complaint With U.S. Attorney Roscoe C. Howard 
Over Brentwood Anthrax Cover-Up (Dec. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Anthrax Lawsuit] 
(detailing information disclosed in a FOIA request that U.S. Postal Service and U.S. 
government officials knew four days before closing the Brentwood mail facility that 
envelopes had leaked anthrax spores, putting the employee population at risk), at 
http://www.judicialwatch.org/2817.shtml (on file with the American University Law 
Review). 
 13. Statement of Davis, supra note 9. 
 14. Statement of Kallstrom, supra note 10. 
 15. See discussion infra Parts II & III (reviewing the reduction of FOIA disclosures 
in the past year). 
 16. See infra notes 249-50 (discussing the media’s lack of coverage of FOIA 
developments in the past year). 
 17. See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing the practical implications of the 
Department of Homeland Security FOIA exemption). 
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 These efforts to erode FOIA will only provide a false sense of 
security at the expense of the public’s right to information.  This new 
framework broadens the preexisting FOIA exemption framework, is 
largely unnecessary, and may even endanger public safety.18  Congress 
has already carved out FOIA exemptions in 5 U.S.C. § 552 in order to 
safeguard sensitive records, without the severe limitations imposed by 
the new FOIA guidelines.19 
 This Comment will reexamine the spirit and purpose behind FOIA, 
arguing that the American public’s right to governmental 
transparency, conceived during the national security crises of the 
Cold War, is as vital today as it was nearly four decades ago.  Part I of 
this Comment will examine FOIA’s history and mechanics.  Part II 
will address the role of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in shaping 
agency decisions in the FOIA request process and assess the roles that 
key figures in the Bush Administration play in restricting the 
availability of government information post-September 11, 2001.  Part 
III will trace the development of the new Department of Homeland 
Security and evaluate the broad FOIA exemption applicable to this 
new cabinet-level department.  Finally, Part IV will argue that recent 
FOIA developments will restrict public access to government 
information, and that these new policies are unnecessary in light of 
the preexisting FOIA exemption framework under 5 U.S.C. § 552.  In 
sum, this Comment concludes that FOIA developments in the 
aftermath of September 11, 2001 have created a climate of 
nondisclosure, and that the “war against terrorism” does not justify 
the magnitude of recent data restrictions imposed by the U.S. 
government. 
I. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT’S HISTORY AND MECHANICS 
 Enacted in 1966,20 FOIA was the first federal law to establish an 
effective legal right of access to government information on the basis 
of openness and accountability.21  Before FOIA, the public bore the 
                                                          
 18. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1 (describing how the Department of Homeland 
Security FOIA exemption broadens the preexisting FOIA exemption framework). 
 19. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (2002). 
 20. Congress passed FOIA “in the late 1960s, during the apparent stalemate in 
the Vietnam War—an event that stimulated popular distrust of government.”  
Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1401. 
 21. See Scott A. Faust, Note, National Security Information Disclosure Under the FOIA:  
The Need for Effective Judicial Enforcement, 25 B.C. L. REV. 611, 643 & n.3 (1984) 
(quoting Senator Long’s comments prior to the enactment of FOIA that “our 
purpose in introducing [FOIA] is that a necessary corollary to the right of a 
democratic people to participate in governmental affairs is the right to acquire 
information,” 111 CONG. REC. S2797 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1965)). 
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burden of demonstrating a right to access government records.22  
Now, however, FOIA grants the public a “right to know” standard for 
access to government information, shifting the burden of proof from 
the public to the government agency seeking to deny access.23  FOIA 
has become one of the primary means by which the public informs 
itself about its government, and it has been used to obtain 
information crucial to the public interest.24  Recently, for example, 
public use of FOIA exposed information on the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration’s projected $4 billion cost overrun for the 
international space station and how prescription rates for Ritalin 
varied from region to region.25  Following the U.S.’s lead, laws 
instituting FOIA’s principles of transparency in government have 
spread across the globe.26 
 Congress amended FOIA four times between 197427 and 1996.28  
The amendments between 1974 and 1986 changed certain 
procedures, modified exemptions, protected sensitive law 
enforcement information, and created new fee provisions.29  The 
1996 amendment, known as the Electronic FOIA (“EFOIA”) 
                                                          
 22. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT:  UPDATE ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1996 ELECTRONIC FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
AMENDMENTS 4 (2002) [hereinafter GAO], available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/gao02493.pdf (on file with the American University 
Law Review).  FOIA replaced the disclosure provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946, which required the government to withhold material 
requiring secrecy in the public interest or material pertinent only to the internal 
affairs of an agency.  Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 
Stat. 237 (1946).  The ultimate effect of this legislation was to limit the amount of 
information the government needed to disclose to the public.  See Schoenhard, supra 
note 1, at 498 (discussing the widely-held view that the Administrative Procedure Act 
actually limited public access to government information). 
 23. GAO, supra note 22, at 4. 
 24. See Thomas Blanton, The World’s Right to Know, FOREIGN POL’Y, July 1, 2002, at 
50 (reporting that FOIA is the world’s most heavily invoked disclosure law). 
 25. FOIA at 35, supra note 11.  In the past, public requests under FOIA led to the 
disclosure of such controversial information as Army reports concerning the 
massacre at My Lai.  See John Moon, The Freedom of Information Act:  A Fundamental 
Contradiction, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1157, 1175 (1985) (citing N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1972, at 
7, col. 1). 
 26. In particular, the past decade has witnessed an expansion in governmental 
transparency worldwide.  See Blanton, supra note 24, at 50 (reporting that in the past 
decade, twenty-six countries, including Bulgaria, South Africa, Thailand, and Japan, 
enacted disclosure statutes guaranteeing the right of access to government 
information).  In light of these developments, it is ironic that “secrecy has made the 
most dramatic comeback” in the U.S.—the country that initially led the shift toward 
government transparency.  Id. 
 27. The Watergate scandal “intensified disclosure efforts and led to the 1974 
amendments strengthening FOIA.”  Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1404 (citing Pub. L. 
No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994))). 
 28. GAO, supra note 22, at 4. 
 29. Id. 
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amendment,30 effectively took FOIA to the Internet, requiring each 
agency to post on its website guides to making FOIA requests.  
Further, this amendment encouraged online public access to 
government information by requiring agencies to make certain 
information available in electronic form.31  As a result, government 
websites thrived on the Internet.32 
 FOIA provides public access to agency records33 through two 
methods:  affirmative agency disclosure and public request for 
disclosure.34  Affirmative agency disclosure takes place through the 
Federal Register publication of information (“the FOIA publication 
requirement”) and the availability of certain records for public 
inspection and copying (“the FOIA reading room requirement”).35  
Public request for disclosure, FOIA’s most well-known component, 
allows any member of the public to request access to information 
held by federal agencies without showing a need or reason for 
seeking the information.36 
 Although the public has a statutory right to request government 
records, agencies are not always required to comply with FOIA 
requests.  Through nine exemptions, FOIA balances the value of 
public disclosure against other important considerations, including 
                                                          
 30. In response to lengthy delays and extensive request backlogs at agencies, 
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced amendments to FOIA for electronic records in 
1994, eventually leading President Clinton to sign the Electronic Freedom of 
Information Act (“EFOIA”) amendment in October 1996.  The National Security 
Archive, The FOIA and President Bill Clinton, at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/ 
foia/clinton.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (on file with the American University 
Law Review). 
 31. The EFOIA amendment encouraged online public access to government 
information by requiring agencies to make six specific types of records, created on or 
after November 1, 1996, available in electronic form.  See GAO, supra note 22, at 8 
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A)–(E) and 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(2)). 
 32. See Schoenhard, supra note 1, at 502 (surveying the availability of government 
information on agency websites). 
 33. “Agency records” are defined as “documents that (1) are either created or 
obtained by an agency and (2) are in that agency’s physical possession and under its 
control at the time of the FOIA request.”  A Blackletter Statement of Federal 
Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 17, 61-62 (2002). 
 34. GAO, supra note 22, at 4; see also Norgle, supra note 3, at 824 (listing the 
information that agencies are obligated to release under FOIA).  “First, agencies 
must publish substantive rules, statements of general policy and information on 
agency organization and procedures in the Federal Register.”  Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(1) (1998)).  “Second, agencies must make final adjudicatory opinions, 
statements of policy not published in the Federal Register, and administrative staff 
manuals and instructions available for inspection and copying.”  Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(2) (1998)).  “Third, agencies must make available other records not falling 
within the first two categories.”  Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1998)).35.GAO, supra 
note 22, at 4. 
 36. Id. 
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national security and the protection of sensitive business 
information.37  Rather than requiring agencies to withhold 
information subject to an exemption, agencies are granted discretion 
to determine whether to safeguard or disclose that information.38  
Moreover, FOIA does not provide access to records held by the U.S. 
Congress or the federal judiciary,39 state or local government agency 
records, or those held by private businesses or individuals.40  Each 
state and the District of Columbia have statutes governing public 
access to their records.41  Finally, requesters dissatisfied with the 
amount of information they receive pursuant to an exemption may 
seek redress in the U.S. District Courts.42 
 In an effort to protect national security, recent government actions 
expanded the FOIA exemption framework and restricted the public’s 
ability to access sensitive government information.43  The Executive 
Branch, particularly the DOJ, has thus far played a key role in 
creating a new climate of nondisclosure whereby the public could be 
increasingly denied access to government information. 
II. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FOIA IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Background 
 The DOJ plays an integral role in interpreting and developing 
FOIA, overseeing agencies’ compliance with FOIA, defending 
agencies’ decisions in court, and serving as the primary source of 
policy guidance for agencies.44  The number of FOIA-related matters 
                                                          
 37. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (2002); see Joseph Summerill, Is It Safe For Your Client 
To Provide The Government With Homeland Security Data?, 50 FED. LAWYER 24, 26 (2003) 
(arguing that the exemptions indicate that sometimes the interest in protecting 
sensitive records outweighs the public interest of disclosure). 
 38. See Ronald Backes, Comment, Freedom, Information, Security, 10 SETON HALL 
CONST. L.J. 927, 976 (2000) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 
(1979)). 
 39. The National Security Archive, About the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foia/aboutfoia.html  (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) 
(on file with the American University Law Review). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Judges determine the propriety of agency withholdings de novo and agencies 
must bear the burden of sustaining their nondisclosure actions.  5 U.S.C. § 
552(a)(4)(B)-(C) (2002).  But see Moon, supra note 25, at 1178, 1188 (citing 
disagreement over whether judges objectively apply FOIA, and concluding that 
“judicial construction of the FOIA is an exercise in subjectivity”). 
 43. See discussion infra Parts II & III (reviewing FOIA developments in the 
Executive and Legislative branches post-September 11, 2001). 
 44. DOJ published a newsletter called FOIA Update, wrote A Short Guide to the 
Freedom of Information Act, and regularly issued an analytical Freedom Of Information 
Case List of court decisions in order to provide the government with a better 
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at DOJ exploded in the mid-1970s and has increased steadily.45  The 
public submitted 1,965,919 FOIA requests to federal agencies in fiscal 
year 1999, and agencies processed 1,939,668 requests that same 
year.46  Along with the massive number of requests came high levels of 
backlogs as agencies scrambled to meet the public’s needs.47 
 Because DOJ plays such a critical role in shaping agency responses 
to FOIA requests,48 several Attorneys General left their particular 
Administration’s mark on FOIA policy.49  The Attorney General 
traditionally issues a new FOIA policy statement at the beginning of a 
new Administration—at least when the incoming President has a 
different political affiliation from the former.50  The various 
Administrations’ approaches to FOIA are extremely important 
because they ultimately determine how DOJ attorneys will represent 
agency decisions to withhold information.  The FOIA policies of the 
                                                          
understanding of FOIA.  Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1404-05.  In 2000, DOJ developed 
FOIA Post, a means of disseminating FOIA information to federal agencies that is 
located on the DOJ FOIA website at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/ 
mainpage.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (on file with the American University Law 
Review). 
 45. Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1403.  Saloschin, a former attorney in the DOJ’s 
Office of Legal Counsel, argues that the reasons behind this expansion in FOIA-
related matters included the “vigorous use of FOIA by Ralph Nader and his 
associates; the growing popularity of FOIA as a form of pre-trial discovery among 
litigators; the use of FOIA by various scholars, advocates, and authors; and the use of 
FOIA on behalf of businesses involved in publishing or in government procurement 
or regulation.”  Id. at 1401, 1403-04. 
 46. See, e.g., FOIA at 35, supra note 11 (providing a summary of FOIA requests 
filed in fiscal year 1999).  George Washington University’s National Security Archive, 
the nation’s primary non-profit FOIA user, also collects data pertaining to its own 
FOIA requests.  Id. 
 47. For example, on one National Security Archive request filed in 1990, the 
Central Intelligence Agency took nine years to deny fully twenty-two documents, and 
another seven months to deny the National Security Archive’s appeal.  Id.  See, e.g., 
Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1404 (arguing that in the 1970s, “appeals to the Attorney 
General from initial denials of DOJ records skyrocketed from about six per year to 
approximately a thousand,” leading to the creation of a new appeals office); GAO, 
supra note 22, at 42 (detailing the Department of Energy’s median time to process a 
request in Fiscal Year 1999 as 250 days). 
 48. Saloschin writes that “[t]he DOJ must balance several functions that 
potentially conflict in FOIA work.”  Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1405.  DOJ serves as 
the legal advisor to the government and litigates on behalf of almost all federal 
agencies.  Id.  However, because the DOJ is the government’s “law enforcement 
arm,” it must ensure agency compliance with all laws.  See id. at 1405-06 (citing 5 
U.S.C. § 552(e)(5) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).  Therefore, conflicts may arise when 
DOJ performs more than one of these functions.  Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1406. 
 49. See Norgle, supra note 3, at 825 (arguing that the Executive Branch under the 
Clinton Administration made an effort to further strengthen federal agency 
adherence to FOIA, citing Administration Tells Agencies to Tilt Toward FOIA Disclosure, 
62 U.S.L.W. 15, 20 (1993)). 
 50. Such statements were issued in May 1977 by Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, 
in May 1981 by Attorney General William French Smith, in October 1993 by Attorney 
General Janet Reno, and in 2001 by Attorney General John Ashcroft.  GAO, supra 
note 22, at 10. 
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Clinton and Bush Administrations provide an interesting study of 
contrasting approaches to government disclosures. 
B. The Expansion of Disclosure Under the Clinton Administration 
 President William J. Clinton and Attorney General Janet Reno 
ushered in an era of increased FOIA disclosures through concurrent 
FOIA memoranda issued on October 4, 1993.51  President Clinton’s 
memorandum reaffirmed the value of a free and open society and 
asked agencies to “renew their commitment to [FOIA], to its 
underlying principles of government openness, and to its sound 
administration.”52  Attorney General Reno’s memorandum further 
developed the Administration’s concept of these principles, 
overturning the Reagan Administration’s “substantial legal basis” 
threshold for agency defense and replacing it with a “presumption of 
disclosure.”53 
 Specifically, Attorney General Reno’s memorandum established a 
“foreseeable harm” standard, committing DOJ to defend an agency’s 
decision to withhold information “only in those cases where the 
agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would be harmful to an 
interest protected by that exemption.”54 Reno further instructed 
agencies that “[w]here an item of information might technically or 
arguably fall within an exemption, it ought not to be withheld from a 
FOIA requester unless it need be,”55 and stated that the principle of 
openness in government should be applied in “every disclosure and 
non-disclosure decision.”56  The Administration believed that this 
policy best served the public interest because it achieved FOIA’s main 
objective—“maximum responsible disclosure of government 
information—while preserving essential confidentiality.”57  This policy 
                                                          
 51. Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Heads of All Federal 
Departments and Agencies re:  The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 4, 1993) 
[hereinafter Reno Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_ 
updates/Vol_XIV_3/page3.htm (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 52. Memorandum from William J. Clinton, President of the United States, to 
Heads of Departments and Agencies re:  The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 4, 
1993) [hereinafter Clinton Memorandum], available at http://www.gwu.edu/ 
~nsarchiv/nsa/foia/whinitial.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).  
In handling requests, President Clinton petitioned agencies to handle requests for 
information in a “customer-friendly manner.”  Id. 
 53. Reno Memorandum, supra note 51.  The memorandum also pointed out that 
many departments have backlogs due to fewer resources and heavy workloads, and 
identified this as a serious problem.  Id. 
 54. Id. (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Reno Memorandum, supra note 51 (justifying the Clinton 
Administration’s presumption of disclosure). 
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remained in effect throughout the Clinton Administration, and 
agencies continued to follow this guidance until October 2001.58 
C. The Erosion of FOIA Under the Bush Administration 
 The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 led the Bush 
Administration to rethink government policies toward disclosure of 
government information.59  FOIA was not immune:  Attorney General 
John Ashcroft introduced a new FOIA policy memorandum on 
October 12, 2001 (“Ashcroft Memorandum”).60  In the 
memorandum, Attorney General Ashcroft encouraged the protection 
of national security, sensitive business information, and personal 
privacy.61  Specifically, the Ashcroft Memorandum assured agencies 
that “the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they 
lack a sound legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of adverse 
impact on the ability of other agencies to protect other important 
records.”62  This memorandum officially replaced the Clinton 
Administration’s “foreseeable harm” standard with a new “sound 
legal basis” standard governing DOJ’s defense of FOIA lawsuits.63  
                                                          
 58. See FOIA POST, New Attorney General FOIA Memorandum Issued (reporting that 
Attorney General Ashcroft’s FOIA memorandum superseded the Clinton 
Administration’s 1993 FOIA policy), at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2001 
foiapost19.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (on file with the American University Law 
Review). 
 59. See, e.g., Press Briefing, The White House, The President’s Announcement on 
Homeland Security (June 6, 2002) [hereinafter Homeland Defense Press Briefing] 
(asserting that “in times of crisis, we ask our leaders to do big things, to respond to 
the crisis”), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/ 
20020606-6.html (on file with the American University Law Review); Blanton, supra 
note 24 (arguing that it became apparent to our government that increased 
governmental secrecy could be a “crucial weapon in the war against terror”); Parker, 
supra note 3 (reporting a “dramatic turnabout from the policies of the past three 
decades,” and that since September 11, 2001, “the Bush Administration has moved 
more quickly than any administration since World War II to make government 
activities, documents and other information secret”).  
 60. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to Heads of all Federal 
Departments and Agencies re:  The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001) 
[hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/ 
011012.htm (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 61. Id.  Attorney General Ashcroft directed agencies to make a “full and 
deliberate consideration of the institutional, commercial, and personal privacy 
interests” when determining whether to make disclosures under FOIA.  Id.  Critics 
argue this turns FOIA into a balancing act.  See Schoenhard, supra note 1, at 504 
(arguing that the Ashcroft Memorandum, in establishing the “concepts of 
Government transparency and freedom as mutually exclusive goals” of the DOJ, 
made FOIA “more of a balancing act than a statutory mandate”). 
 62. Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 60 (emphasis added).  “The result 
appears to be that the DOJ will support an agency withholding information from the 
public unless (a) there is no chance the DOJ will win the subsequent lawsuit; or 
(b) to support the agency in question might disclose other Government 
information.”  Schoenhard, supra note 1, at 504. 
 63. Id.  Justification for this deviation came from the realities of September 11, 
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This is a higher threshold for disclosure than the Clinton 
Administration’s policy of defending agency decisions to withhold 
information only where disclosure would likely harm a party 
protected by the exemptions. 
 Approximately five months after agencies received the Ashcroft 
Memorandum, amidst continuing public anger over the September 
11, 2001 attacks,64 White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card issued 
further FOIA guidance imploring agencies to safeguard government 
records relating to weapons of mass destruction (“Card 
Memorandum”).65  The Card Memorandum instructed agencies to 
review government information “regarding weapons of mass 
destruction, as well as other information that could be misused to 
harm the security of our nation and the safety of our people,”66 and 
required agencies to report their reviews to the Office of Homeland 
Security no later than ninety days after March 19, 2002.67  In 
response, agencies removed public access to thousands of 
documents.68 
 A supplemental memorandum from Laura L.S. Kimberly, Acting 
Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, provided 
guidance on implementation of the Card Memorandum.69  Not 
surprisingly, Kimberly gave a broad definition for “sensitive 
information,” defining it as “government information regarding 
weapons of mass destruction, as well as other information that could 
be misused to harm the security of our nation or threaten public 
                                                          
2001.  To buttress this memorandum, the Bush Administration urges agencies to use 
FOIA exemptions to prevent potential disclosures relating to the nation’s critical 
infrastructure and to protect agency information that could enable a party to unleash 
further terror on the U.S.  Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 60. 
 64. See Mark Tapscott, Too Many Secrets, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2002, at A25 
(connecting the restriction of government disclosures with the al Qaeda September 
11, 2001 attacks). 
 65. Memorandum from Andrew Card, Assistant to the President and Chief of 
Staff, to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies re:  Action to Safeguard 
Information Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Sensitive 
Documents Related to Homeland Security (Mar. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Card 
Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost10.htm 
(on file with the American University Law Review). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Tapscott, supra note 64; see infra note 143 and accompanying text (detailing 
specific reports of information removed from government websites). 
 69. Memorandum from Laura L.S. Kimberly, Acting Director, Information 
Security Oversight Office, to Departments and Agencies re:  Safeguarding 
Information Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Sensitive Records 
Related to Homeland Security (Mar. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Kimberly 
Memorandum], at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost10.htm (on file 
with the American University Law Review). 
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safety.”70  Kimberly elaborated on the protection of classified 
information under Executive Order 1295871 (“Classified National 
Security Information”) and information that had been unclassified or 
declassified.72  Importantly, Kimberly also directed that the disclosure 
of sensitive but unclassified information should be “carefully 
considered, on a case-by-case basis,” alongside the “benefits that 
result from the open and efficient exchange of scientific, technical, 
and like information.”73 
 Finally, Kimberly instructed all agencies that any FOIA request for 
records containing sensitive information be processed in accordance 
with the Ashcroft Memorandum—“giving full and careful 
consideration to all applicable FOIA exemptions.”74  Coupled with 
the broad new FOIA exemption for the Department of Homeland 
Security described in the next section, the federal government, under 
President Bush, has created an environment in which the public 
could be denied FOIA’s full benefits.75 
III. THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 
A. The Origins of a Department of Homeland Security 
 Congress and the President created the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”) in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks.76  In the hours following the attacks, government employees 
from all agencies scrambled to provide assistance to the Bush 
                                                          
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. (providing for the classification of information that would assist in the 
development or use of weapons of mass destruction for up to twenty-five years, even 
though there is a standard of declassifying classified information within ten years of 
its original classification). 
 72. See id. (indicating that if the information never was classified and never was 
disclosed to the public under proper authority, but could “reasonably be expected to 
assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction, it should be 
classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958”; if information was classified 
and then declassified, but was never disclosed to the public “under proper authority,” 
it should likewise be reclassified under Executive Order 12958). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See discussion infra Part IV (arguing that the Bush Administration’s FOIA 
policy and the Department of Homeland Security’s broad FOIA exemption 
contribute to an overall climate of nondisclosure). 
 76. Jessica Reaves, Homeland Security:  A Primer, TIME (ONLINE ED.), Nov. 19, 2002, 
at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,391161,00.html (on file with 
the American University Law Review).  But see Homeland Defense Press Briefing, 
supra note 59 (reporting that President Bush directed Vice President Cheney to 
begin the task of looking at the current structure of the federal government and its 
capability of addressing terrorist attacks in May 2001). 
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Administration.77  When they encountered procedural red tape and 
communication barriers, some opined that there should be one 
unified department to combat and respond to future terrorist attacks 
on U.S. soil.78  It took a little over a year for that request to evolve into 
a new Cabinet-level agency.79 
 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA”)80 passed the House in 
July 2002, but disputes over workers’ rights,81 as well as other 
controversial provisions,82 impeded passage in the Senate for 
                                                          
 77. Reaves, supra note 76. 
 78. Id.  Indeed, President Bush’s initial proposal of a Cabinet-level Department 
of Homeland Security called for “substantially transforming the current confusing 
patchwork of government activities into a single department whose primary mission 
is to protect our homeland.”  Id. 
 79. President Bush initially established an Office of Homeland Security by 
Executive Order on October 8, 2001.  See Press Release, The White House, Executive 
Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security (Oct. 8, 2001) (establishing the 
Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011008-2.html. (on file with 
the American University Law Review).  Senators Joseph Lieberman and Arlen 
Specter subsequently introduced Senate legislation to create a Cabinet-level 
Department of Homeland Security.  See Press Release, Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, Lieberman, Specter Offer Homeland Defense Legislation 
(Oct. 11, 2001), at http://www.senate.gov/ ~gov_affairs/101101homedefpress.htm 
(arguing that the country needs an executive-level department to carry out the 
functions of homeland defense) (on file with the American University Law Review).  
The idea for a Cabinet-level department was based largely on the recommendations 
of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, commonly known as the 
Hart-Rudman Commission.  Id.  See also Critical Infrastructure Protection:  Who’s In 
Charge?:  Hearing of the S. Governmental Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement 
of Sen. Cleland, Member, S. Governmental Affairs Comm.) [hereinafter Statement 
of Cleland] (describing the Commission’s finding that it was inevitable a terrorist 
attack would occur, it was just a matter of when and recommending a “full-blown” 
homeland defense agency).  After President Bush officially supported the creation of 
a Department of Homeland Security in early June 2002, see Homeland Defense Press 
Briefing, supra note 59 (supporting the creation of a Department of Homeland 
Security), it was only a matter of time before the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
(“HSA”) passed in the House and Senate. 
 80. H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (2002), Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
 81. While most Democrats argued that DHS employees should be given the same 
protections as other government employees, President Bush and other Republicans 
responded that the President “should have the power to hire, fire, and discipline any 
staff member for any reason” because “the sensitivity of this department’s mission 
demand[s] fast action.”  Reaves, supra note 76.  This debate continued in the Senate 
for months, until the widespread Republican gains in the midterm elections brought 
both parties to the “bargaining table” and paved the way for the HSA’s ultimate 
passage.  Id. 
 82. Provisions allowing guns in the cockpit, as well as small pox vaccinations, are 
included in the final Act.  Compromise Reached on Homeland Security Bill, CNN, Nov. 13, 
2002 [hereinafter Compromise], at http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/ 
11/12/homeland.security/index.html (on file with the American University Law 
Review); see Reaves, supra note 76 (describing the debate over a “Total Information 
Awareness” system, which would give the government “virtually unfettered access to 
private information exchanged between U.S. citizens,” including e-mail, banking 
records and travel documents). 
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months.83  After Republicans gained seats in the November 2002 
midterm elections, the HSA became President Bush’s main priority 
and quickly moved through both houses of Congress, reflecting the 
President’s “dramatically enhanced clout.”84 
 The newly-created DHS marks the first major government 
restructuring since the creation of the Department of Energy in 
1977,85 and the creation of the nation’s third largest federal agency.86  
With a beginning budget of $37 billion, DHS encompasses 170,000 
workers from twenty-two agencies, including the Secret Service, 
Border Patrol, Coast Guard, and Customs Service.87  The 
Department’s mission to coordinate counter-terrorism measures and 
preemptive defense will be carried out through the Department’s 
four divisions:  border and transportation security; emergency 
preparedness and response; countermeasures for chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks; and an intelligence 
clearinghouse.88 
 Buried deep within the HSA, however, is a troubling FOIA 
development.89  Despite the DHS’s noble duty of protecting national 
                                                          
 83. See Darren Samuelsohn, Homeland Security Bill Passes Senate With New FOIA 
Exemptions Included, GREENWIRE, Nov. 20, 2002, available at Westlaw, 11/20/02 EEP-
GRW art. 6 (reporting that the new FOIA exemption “that gives U.S. industries, 
including chemical manufacturers and utilities, an exemption from the [FOIA]” did 
not gain the same degree of attention from Congress as did numerous other 
homeland security issues). 
 84. Helen Dewar, Homeland Bill Gets Boost, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2002, at A01.  In 
light of the midterm elections in November 2002, President Bush designated passage 
of the HSA as his main priority for the rest of the Congressional term.  Id.  See Helen 
Dewar, Homeland Security Legislation Becomes Republican Priority, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 
2002, at A05 (reporting that House and Senate Republican leaders told President 
Bush they would spend the post-election session attempting to pass the DHS 
legislation); see also Compromise, supra note 82 (citing passage of the Homeland 
Security Act as “the president’s top priority in the lame-duck Congress”).  The HSA 
passed the House by a vote of 299-121, and it passed the Senate by a vote of 90-9.  
Samuelsohn, supra note 83. 
 85. Reaves, supra note 76. 
 86. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM 
RISKS:  DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 3 (2003) [hereinafter GAO DHS], at 
http://www.gao.gov/pas/2003/d03102.pdf (on file with the American University 
Law Review). 
 87. Compromise, supra note 82.  DHS must quickly and effectively integrate 
disparate agencies and activities into one cohesive organization, marking a 
government restructuring of unmatched proportions.  GAO DHS, supra note 86, at 6. 
 88. Reaves, supra note 76. 
 89. See 148 CONG. REC. S11405-03, S11423 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy) [hereinafter Statement of Leahy] (arguing that the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002’s FOIA provisions are “entirely unnecessary” to the establishment of the 
Department of Homeland Security).  Senator Leahy, the leading FOIA champion in 
the Senate, deemed the provision “the most severe weakening of [FOIA] in its 36-
year history.”  Id. at S11425.  Unlike the Ashcroft Memorandum, which implored 
agencies to be more careful with the release of information, the HSA, through the 
Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (“CIIA”), actually provides a blanket 
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security, its establishing legislation provides a blanket FOIA 
exemption90 for private industries supporting the nation’s critical 
infrastructure.91  
B. A New FOIA Exemption Under the Critical Infrastructure  
Information Act of 2002 
 In pertinent part, § 214(a)(1) of the HSA provides: 
critical infrastructure information (including the identity of the 
submitting person or entity) that is voluntarily submitted to a covered 
Federal agency for use by that agency regarding the security of 
critical infrastructure and protected systems . . . shall be exempt from 
disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly 
referred to as the Freedom of Information Act).92 
 This provision, subtitled as the “Critical Infrastructure Act of 2002” 
(“CIIA”), grants authority to impose a fine, up to a year of 
imprisonment, or both, as well as removal from employment, upon 
any government offender who discloses this protected infrastructure 
information.93  The measure is an exact replica of the FOIA proposal 
in the original House Act, which passed in July 2002.  In the rush to 
                                                          
FOIA exemption:  the agency cannot release any information provided by private 
industry relating to the nation’s critical infrastructure. 
That this extreme provision is buried deep in the HSA troubles many.  See, e.g., 
Samuelsohn, supra note 83 (quoting Charles Davis, executive director of the 
Freedom of Information Center at the University of Missouri School of Journalism as 
stating that “by burying [the FOIA provision] in homeland security, it becomes 
motherhood and apple pie”); Administrative Law, Adjudicatory Issues, and Privacy 
Ramifications of Creating a Department of Homeland Security:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Commercial & Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 28 
(2002) (statement of Peter Swire, Professor of Law, Ohio State University) (citing as 
troubling the “apparently slipshod manner in which such an important topic was 
inserted” into the HSA) [hereinafter Statement of Swire]. 
 90. See Samuelsohn, supra note 83 (quoting an aide to Senator Leahy as stating  
that the new FOIA exemptions permit the “federal government to trump any state’s 
own FOIA protections.”  The aide called the FOIA exemption under the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 “about as blanket a pre-emption as you can get”). 
 91. The HSA defines “critical infrastructure” as the “systems and assets, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of 
such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national 
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those 
matters.”  Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 2(4) (2002).  
This is the same definition Congress used in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).  Such a broad definition means that this exemption 
could apply broadly across many sectors, including the financial services and 
telecommunications sectors. 
 92. Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 214(a)(1) (2002) 
(emphasis added). 
 93. Id. § 214(f); see Rena Steinzor, “Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors”:  The 
Homeland Security Act and Corporate Accountability, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 641, 648 
(2003) (arguing that this prohibition against disclosure “gilds the lily of 
confidentiality”). 
UHL.AUTHORCHANGES2MARTINE.A.DOC 2/23/2004  2:22 PM 
278 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:261 
final passage in November, the Senate accepted the prior House 
version of the legislation.94 
 Implementation of the CIIA FOIA provision came one step closer 
to fruition with the DHS’s issuance of interim final rules, effective 
January 27, 2003.95  The rules implement Executive Order 12958 
(protecting “Classified National Security Information”)96 which 
constitutes FOIA Exemption 1, and delineate the Department’s 
general FOIA policy.97  Moreover, on April 15, 2003, DHS released a 
proposed rule governing procedures for handling critical 
infrastructure information under the new CIIA exemption. 98  The 
proposed rule outlines procedures for the receipt and safeguarding 
of critical infrastructure information and elaborates on the 
permissible and prohibited disclosure of this information as provided 
by the CIIA. 99 
 The CIIA FOIA provision will shield from public view sensitive 
infrastructure data submitted voluntary to federal officials by critical 
infrastructure owners and operators.100  Our nation’s critical 
infrastructure traditionally consists of sectors such as information and 
communications, banking and finance,101 transportation, and 
                                                          
 94. See Compromise, supra note 82 (describing a compromise on labor rights that 
allowed for rapid passage of the HSA); see also Samuelsohn, supra note 83 (reporting 
that the last homeland security battle “steered clear” of FOIA). 
 95. According to Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, the interim rule will 
be issued without a delayed effective date because “notice and public procedure 
[would be] impracticable, unnecessary, and contrary to the public interest.”  
Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Procedures for the Department of 
Homeland Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 4056 (Jan. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. ch. 
1 & pt. 5). 
 96. Classified National Security Information for the Department of Homeland 
Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 4073 (Jan. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 7). 
 97. Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Procedures for the Department 
of Homeland Security, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4056-63. 
 98. Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information; Proposed Rule, 
68 Fed. Reg. 18,524 (Apr. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 29). 
 99. See id. at 18,528-18,529. 
 100. See Christopher J. Dorobek, Industry Still Leery About FOIA Rules, FED. 
COMPUTER WEEK, July 29, 2002, at 12.  Moreover, the provision will exempt 
submitters from civil or antitrust liability and impose criminal penalties on 
government employees who disclose the designated information.  See Statement of 
Leahy, supra note 89, at S11425 (asserting that “[c]riminalizing disclosures . . . is an 
effective way to quash discussion and debate over many aspects of the Government’s 
work”). 
 101. A June 2002 survey by Business Software Alliance, a technology industry 
association, showed that seventy-four percent of surveyed technology professionals 
felt “nearly certain” that a cyber attack would be launched against American financial 
institutions by June 2003.  William Matthews, Rep. Smith Sounds Cyberalarm, FED. 
COMPUTER WEEK, July 29, 2002, at 12; see also Thomas P. Vartanian, September 11 
Attacks Illustrated New Risks to Banking System, 167 AM. BANKER, Nov. 2, 2001 (citing an 
increasing number of attacks on financial systems and arguing that increased 
computer access to these systems could mean that these attacks are likely to 
continue).  Of particular concern to Vartanian is that “[c]ritical security 
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energy.102  Government officials argue that this measure will facilitate 
public-private information sharing and will give the government a 
toehold into the private sector so that it may respond quickly and 
effectively to any attack on the nation’s critical infrastructure.103  
Among the information covered by the provision are data concerning 
“any planned or past assessment, projection, or estimate of the 
security vulnerability of a protected system or critical infrastructure 
. . . any planned or past operational problem or solution . . . related 
to the security of a protected system or critical infrastructure; or any 
threat to the security of a protected system or critical 
infrastructure.”104 
 The CIIA FOIA provision shields from liability critical 
infrastructure owners and operators who “voluntarily” report 
information regarding vulnerabilities. 105  Importantly, some courts 
                                                          
infrastructure and data protection issues arise when a company’s electronic networks 
and databases are compromised”; in the case of banks, information containing 
“proprietary business information, monetary value, intellectual property, or customer 
information” could be compromised or stolen.  Id.  Ultimately this could also lead to 
adverse public relations if such an attack were to be disclosed to the public.  Id. 
For an assessment of how the events of September 11, 2001 have affected the 
financial services industry, see id. (arguing that a “distinct shift” has occurred in the 
financial services industry for several reasons, such as the likelihood of customer 
records being more accessible to government officials and the need to reevaluate risk 
exposure in the flow of money and information in the banking and payment systems 
post-September 11, 2001). 
 102. MARK S. SAWYER, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS, 
MISSIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND STRATEGIES 24 (2002) (on file with the American 
University Law Review).  Other critical infrastructure sectors include water supply, 
emergency law enforcement services, emergency fire service and continuity of 
government services, and public health services.  Id. 
 103. John Tritak, director of the Commerce Department’s Critical Infrastructure 
Assurance Office, argues that the real goal of the DHS legislation was to “create an 
environment where dynamic information sharing is taking place and problems can 
be dealt with in real time.”  Brian Krebs, Critics Blast IT Loophole in Homeland Security 
Plan, WASH. POST, July 24, 2002, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn/A58311-2002Jul24 (on file with the American University Law Review); see also 
148 CONG. REC. S11562-03 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen. Bennett) 
[hereinafter Statement of Bennett] (arguing that because the private and public 
sectors are increasingly interconnected and are terrorist targets, it makes sense for 
both targets to share information with each other).  See generally discussion infra Part 
IV.C (listing the government’s reasons for wanting to facilitate public-private 
information sharing relationships). 
 104. See Summerill, supra note 37, at 25, 26 (citing S. 1456 § 4(3) and noting that 
industry views this type of information as proprietary data). 
 105. Industry seems pleased with this new blanket exemption.  See, e.g., Darren 
Samuelsohn, Senate in Home Stretch on Cabinet-level Bill with FOIA Exemption, ENV’T & 
ENERGY DAILY, Nov. 18, 2002 (quoting Kate McGloon, a spokeswoman for the 
American Chemistry Council, as stating that the new language is a “step in the right 
direction” because it will give industry the assurance it needs to provide the 
government with critical security data without fear that the information would be 
released to the public and serve as a guidepost for future terrorist attacks), available 
at Westlaw, 11/13/02 EEP-EED art. 2; Industry Exemption in Homeland Security Bill 
Sparks Controversy, OIL DAILY, Nov. 18, 2002, available at 2002 WL 101846383 
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distinguish between information submitted voluntarily to the 
government, and information required to be submitted to the 
government.106  When the government seeks voluntary disclosure of 
business information, the government must keep that information 
confidential “if it is of a kind that would customarily not be released 
to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.”107  However, 
if the government requires private entities to disclose information, 
that information must be kept confidential only if its disclosure is 
likely to (1) impair the government’s ability to obtain necessary 
information in the future, or (2) “cause substantial harm to the 
competitive position” of the entity from whom the government 
obtained the information.108 
 Prior to the HSA’s final passage, Senators Leahy, Bennett and 
Levin reached a compromise that proposed to narrow the broad CIIA 
FOIA provision but still provide additional nondisclosure protections 
for certain sensitive records.109  The key difference between the final 
version of the CIIA FOIA provision and the compromise provision is 
that the compromise merely provided a FOIA exemption for 
“records,” whereas the final version protects the broader category of 
“information.”110  The Senators recognized that the “information” 
standard is vague and could be exploited simply by reference to 
private sector information contained in a government record.111  
Moreover, the compromise would have limited the exemption to 
records pertaining to “the vulnerability of and threats to critical 
infrastructure,” rather than the CIIA’s broader language requiring 
                                                          
(reporting that the American Petroleum Institute “believes that making public 
security-sensitive information is a potential threat to refineries, pipelines, and 
offshore facilities,” and thus supports the new FOIA exemption). 
 106. See Backes, supra note 38, at 978 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Nat’l 
Aeronautics & Space Admin., 895 F. Supp. 319, 326 (D.D.C. 1995), Critical Mass 
Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(en banc), and Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Research & Dev. Ctr. v. Brown, 443 F. 
Supp. 1225, 1228 (E.D. Va. 1977)). 
 107. See Backes, supra note 38, at 978 (citing Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 879). 
 108. See id. (citing Westinghouse, 443 F. Supp. at 1228-29). 
 109. This compromise was offered and approved unanimously during the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee markup on the bill.  Amendment to Scale Back FOIA 
Exemption for Homeland Security Department (July 25, 2002) [hereinafter Amendment], at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2002/07/leahy-foi.html (on file with the American 
University Law Review).  See Statement of Leahy, supra note 89 at S11425 (asserting 
that the enacted version “jettisoned the bipartisan compromise” and “replaced it with 
a big-business wish-list gussied up in security garb”). 
 110. See Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11425 (arguing that by using the 
term “records” rather than “information,” the government would avoid the “adverse 
result of government agency-created and generated documents and databases being 
put off-limits . . . simply if private sector ‘information’ is incorporated”). 
 111. Amendment, supra note 109. 
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protection of any “critical infrastructure information.”112  After all, 
under the CIIA, any document labeled as containing “critical 
infrastructure information” would be off-limits to the public. 
 Following FOIA legal precedent,113 the compromise legislation also 
ensured that those portions of records that do not fall within a 
specific FOIA exemption would still be disclosed to FOIA 
requesters.114  Finally, the compromise legislation did not exempt 
industry from civil or antitrust liability, did not preempt state and 
local freedom of information laws, and only applied to records 
submitted to DHS.115  This compromise was all but ignored in 
November 2002, perhaps due to the Republicans’ enhanced clout 
following the November midterm elections.116  Though they differed 
in their respective approaches, both the CIIA FOIA provision and the 
Senate compromise provision focused on critical infrastructure 
protection because our nation’s physical and cyber infrastructure is a 
potential target for future terrorist attacks. 
1. Critical infrastructure protection 
 Just as the U.S. economy was a target on September 11, 2001,117 it is 
a foregone conclusion that terrorists will continue to target our 
nation’s critical infrastructure.118  This places the U.S. government in 
a precarious position, as estimates indicate that up to ninety percent 
                                                          
 112. Id. (emphasis added). 
 113. See generally Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) (holding that 
agencies may disclose nonsecret factual portions of protected records).   
 114. Statement of Leahy, supra note 89. 
 115. Amendment, supra note 109. 
 116. See Eleanor Clift, Capitol Letter:  The Latest Debacle, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 22, 2002 
(arguing that the Bush Administration used its “post-election muscle . . . to extend a 
blanket of secrecy over government business that has even a tangential link to 
homeland security”), available at http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/838892.asp (on file 
with the American University Law Review).  Clift argues that the DHS FOIA provision 
passed “with nobody paying attention and the Democrats demoralized.”  Id. 
 117. See Ross Kerber, Send in the Cyber G-Men:  Private Sector Urged to Partner in 
Defense, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 15, 2001, at C1 (citing a report by Dartmouth’s Institute 
for Security Technology Studies as stating that the September 11, 2001 attacks closed 
financial markets and “destroyed a significant component of the financial 
information infrastructure in New York City”); see also Critical Infrastructure Protection:  
Who’s in Charge?:  Hearing of the S. Governmental Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. 4 (2001) 
(statement of Sen. Carnahan, Member, S. Governmental Affairs Comm.) (asserting 
that the September 11, 2001 terrorists not only wanted to bring down our buildings, 
but to injure our economy, our military, and our “financial and political 
infrastructure”). 
 118. Basically, the definition of “infrastructure covers just about everything of 
value in our country.”  See Statement of Cleland, supra note 79 (noting that 
“[n]othing affects Americans more than the disruption of the Nation’s 
[infrastructure]”).  Our nation’s infrastructure sectors are increasingly becoming 
interdependent, so disruptions in one sector could ultimately have repercussions 
across many sectors.  Id. 
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of the nation’s critical infrastructure industries are privately owned 
and independently operated,119 and many of them remain vulnerable 
to attack.120  Many government insiders believe that the new CIIA 
FOIA exemption will encourage these industries to share sensitive 
information with the government and ultimately lead to public-
private cooperation in the “war against terrorism.”121  However, this 
Comment will later demonstrate that even with this broad new 
exemption, critical infrastructure owners and operators might 
continue to withhold sensitive information due to trust and 
uncertainty issues surrounding potential partnerships with the 
government.122 
2. The likelihood of cyber attacks 
 The CIIA FOIA provision addresses not only conventional attacks 
on the nation’s physical critical infrastructure, but also 
unconventional attacks on our nation’s computer information and 
communication infrastructure.123  Key sectors such as 
telecommunications, power distribution, water supply, public health 
services, national defense, and emergency services all depend upon 
                                                          
 119. See Statement of Davis, supra note 9 (emphasizing that although sensitive 
critical infrastructure information is now shared within some industries, such 
information is not shared with the government or shared across industries); see also 
Exec. Order. No. 13,231, 3 C.F.R. 806 (2002), reprinted in 6 U.S.C. § 121 (2002) 
(implementing a critical infrastructure protection program composed of a “voluntary 
public-private partnership, involving corporate and nongovernmental 
organizations.”). 
 120. See Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 7, at 26 (reporting that much of 
our critical infrastructure is as vulnerable to attack today as it was a year ago); see also 
Critical Infrastructure Protection:  Who’s In Charge?:  Hearing of the S. Governmental Affairs 
Comm., 107th Cong. 28 (2001) (statement of Frank Cilluffo, Senior Policy Analyst 
and Deputy Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies) [hereinafter 
Statement of Cilluffo] (arguing that the nation’s infrastructure is a “popular terrorist 
target” and that the “destruction or incapacitation [of these systems] could have a 
debilitating effect on U.S. national or economic security”). 
 121. See NSPPCIKA, supra note 6, at 26 (reporting that the CIIA assists in removing 
legal obstacles to public-private information sharing). 
 122. See discussion infra Part IV.C.3 (discussing cultural problems such as industry 
distrust and uncertainty as obstacles to public-private information sharing). 
 123. This has significant import because “[c]omputers power the economy.”  See 
Emily Frye, The Tragedy of the Cybercommons:  Overcoming Fundamental Vulnerabilities to 
Critical Infrastructures in a Networked World, 58 BUS. LAW. 349, 350 (2002) (quoting 
National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice as stating that “the cyber economy is the 
economy” in her Address to the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce (Mar. 23, 2001)), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/sec- 
urity.pdf) (on file with the American University Law Review).  See generally Eric Talbot 
Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure:  A Use of Force Invoking the 
Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207 (2002) (arguing that cyber attacks 
targeting the nation’s critical infrastructure are an act of aggression and allow the 
victim state to act in anticipatory self-defense). 
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networked operations.124  Experts warn that our population’s 
increased reliance on computer networks125 could ultimately pose a 
new threat of cyber attacks.126  Frighteningly, just one successful cyber 
attack has the potential to cause widespread damage and result in 
thousands of deaths.127  As enumerated by counter-terrorism adviser 
                                                          
 124. Tim Hackman, director of public affairs for International Business Machines 
Corp.’s government programs, argued that “[c]yber-security and electronic 
infrastructure are such a pervasive foundation of everything in our country that we 
need to raise the focus of that in the [DHS] legislation.”  Ariana Eunjung Cha, Cyber-
Security is Underplayed, Industry Says, WASH. POST, July 4, 2002, at E01. 
 125. See Creating the Department of Homeland Security:  Consideration of the 
Administration’s Proposal Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigation of 
the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 335 (2002) (statement of Robert 
F. Dacey, Director, GAO) [hereinafter Statement of Dacey] (arguing that 
“widespread interconnectivity poses significant risks to our computer systems and . . . 
the critical operations and infrastructures they support”); see also Statement of 
Bennett, supra note 103 (stating that pipelines can be controlled remotely by 
computers, and that a weakness in a telecommunications system could affect both 
the functioning of the military and the financial services sector). 
 126. Richard Clarke, former National Coordinator for Security Infrastructure 
Protection and Counterterrorism within the National Security Counsel and currently 
President Bush’s special advisor on cyberspace security, cautioned that terrorists 
could attack the U.S. through cyber attacks, consisting of attacks on the nation’s 
infrastructure “not from bombs but with computers.”  See Jensen, supra note 123, at 
211 (quoting Richard Clarke, Keynote Address:  Threats to U.S. National Security:  
Proposed Partnership Initiatives Toward Preventing Cyber Terrorist Attacks, 12 DEPAUL BUS. 
L.J. 33, 35 (1999)).  Clark posed the frightening prospect that the U.S. may 
experience an “electronic Pearl Harbor,” when concurrent cyber attacks could 
disable cities’ power, telecommunications, and transportation.  Id. at 212 (quoting 
Clarke, supra, at 38).  See also Kerber, supra note 117 (reporting that security planners 
have noted that past military actions “prompted a response from hackers 
worldwide”). 
 127. See Matthews, supra note 101, at 12 (reporting the remarks of Rep. Lamar 
Smith to a group of technology industry insiders and congressional staffers).  As an 
example of just how vulnerable our computer networks may be, see Jensen, supra 
note 123, at 209, in which the author describes an October 2000 computer hack at 
the Microsoft Corporation. The hackers may have accessed Microsoft’s software 
source code using a relatively unsophisticated program (called a Trojan horse), 
giving them the ability to either alter program operations or install hacker tools into 
the software.  Id. at 210 (citing ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE ET AL., CENTER FOR STRATEGIC 
& INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, CYBER THREATS AND INFORMATION SECURITY MEETING THE 
21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE iv (2000), available at http://www.csis.org/homeland/ 
reports/cyberthreatsandinfosec.pdf) (on file with the American University Law 
Review).  Although Microsoft denied any serious damage, see id. at 209 (citing Dan 
Verton, Think Tank Warns That Microsoft Hack Could Pose National Security Risk, 
COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 2000, available at http://www.computerworld.com/security 
topics/security/story/0,10801,55656,00.html) (on file with the American University 
Law Review), a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (“CSIS”) 
argued that “if this could happen to Microsoft, then no company is safe.”  See id. 
(citing BORCHGRAVE ET AL., supra).  The CSIS report further argued that if someone 
can hack into the “heart of the ubiquitous Windows program [they] can hack into 
any PC in the world that uses it and is connected to the Internet.”  Jensen, supra note 
123, at 210 (citing BORCHGRAVE ET AL., supra, at iv).  Some notorious hacking cases 
remain unsolved.  See Kerber, supra note 117 (citing attacks that shut down Yahoo 
Inc. and E*Trade in February 2000).  Criminals continue to take advantage of 
weaknesses in computer networks.  Recently, Federal authorities charged three men 
in the largest identity theft case to date, in which the perpetrators allegedly obtained 
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James Kallstrom at a House hearing, the potential cyber attack 
scenarios are frightening:  air traffic control equipment malfunctions, 
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems modified to 
circulate harmful gases within a large office complex, 911 telephone 
communications interrupted, electrical blackouts, power dam water 
flow modified to allow downstream flooding, and financial market 
disruption.128  Through use of the Internet, cyber terrorists could 
carry out all of these attacks at once.129 
 Indeed, terrorists may soon use the Internet as a “direct instrument 
of bloodshed.”130  Thus far, no traditional terrorist groups have used 
the Internet to attack our critical infrastructure.131  However, evidence 
indicates that members of al Qaeda have researched the possibility of 
electronically disabling or destroying our nation’s critical 
infrastructure, including dams and communications systems.132  In a 
                                                          
network access codes to credit reports and defrauded some 30,000 individuals.  Feds 
Charge 3 in Massive Credit Fraud Scheme, CNN, Nov. 25, 2002, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/11/25/ID.theft/index.html (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
The alleged criminals deleted the victims’ bank accounts, ordered new checks, 
ATM cards, and credit cards using the victims’ identities, and opened new lines of 
credit, only to immediately disburse the funds.  Id. 
 128. See Statement of Kallstrom, supra note 10 (arguing that technology can be 
used as a weapon of mass destruction). 
 129. See Statement of Cilluffo, supra note 120, at 27 (stating that  “[T]he 
comparatively low-tech means employed by the terrorists raises the possibility of a 
cyber strike,” or even a combination of physical and virtual attacks on one or more 
critical infrastructures). 
 130. See Creating the Department of Homeland Security:  Consideration of the 
Administration’s Proposal Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigation of 
the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 226 (2002) (statement of Guy 
Copeland, Vice President, Computer Sciences Corporation) [hereinafter Statement 
of Copeland] (citing evidence of al Qaeda’s internet skills and interest in using 
computers to launch an attack against physical structures). 
 131. Statement of Dacey, supra note 125. 
 132. See, e.g., id. (stating that officials discovered information on computerized 
water systems in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan); Jay Lyman, Worries Mount Over 
Terrorist Cyber Assault, NEWSFACTOR NETWORK, June 27, 2002 (realizing that al Qaeda 
may posses working knowledge of vital infrastructure systems), available at 
http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/18426.html (on file with the American 
University Law Review); see also Brett Stohs, Protecting the Homeland by Exemption:  Why 
the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 Will Degrade the Freedom of Information 
Act, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18 (2002) (noting that “one of the hottest perceived 
threats to America” is “cyberterror” using our electronic infrastructure).  Moreover, 
key al Qaeda members have shown a high degree of technical proficiency regarding 
computer systems.  Kerber, supra note 117.  For example, investigators found that 
Ramzi Yousef, the convicted mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 
encrypted details of other attack plans on his laptop computer.  Id.  Investigators also 
discovered an al Qaeda hideout in Pakistan that was used solely for the purpose of 
training operatives in cyber warfare and hacking.  See also Frye, supra note 123 (citing 
Kelli Arena & David Ensor, U.S. Infrastructure Information Found on Al Qaeda Computers 
(June 27, 2002), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/06/27/alqaeda.cyber.threat/ 
index.html (on file with the American University Law Review)). 
UHL.AUTHORCHANGES2MARTINE.A.DOC 2/23/2004  2:22 PM 
2003] THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 285 
briefing for members of Congress on July 23, 2002, Representative 
Lamar Smith warned that there is a fifty percent chance that the next 
al Qaeda terrorist strike against the U.S. will somehow involve a cyber 
attack.133  Therefore, determining how to secure cyberspace is critical 
to our national security, especially considering this country’s 
dependence on computer networks.134 
 The federal government used the U.S.’s apparent vulnerabilities in 
our physical and electronic infrastructure to justify legislation and 
policies that could undermine FOIA.  However, the preexisting FOIA 
exemption framework provides the government with adequate tools 
to protect critical infrastructure information, thus obviating the need 
for this erosion of FOIA. 
IV. DISCUSSION:  THE UNNECESSARY EROSION OF FOIA AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENTAL TRANSPARENCY, PUBLIC SAFETY 
AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE INFORMATION SHARING PARTNERSHIPS 
A. The Bush Administration’s Policy Shift Takes a Broad Step Toward 
Restricting Public Access to Government Information 
 As described above, the Ashcroft Memorandum effectively requires 
the public to have a “need to know” the information it requests,135 the 
same legal standard that existed prior to the enactment of FOIA in 
1966.136  Such a high standard of proof on the part of the requesters 
                                                          
 133. See Matthews, supra note 101, at 12.  Representative Smith, Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee’s Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security 
Subcommittee, warned that there is evidence that al Qaeda operatives have searched 
U.S. websites and researched the country’s electronic infrastructure to find ways to 
“disable power and water supplies, disrupt phone service and damage other parts of 
the infrastructure.”  Id.  He particularly cautioned that al Qaeda members might 
attempt to disable California’s energy network.  Id. 
 134. See Cha, supra note 124, at E01 (discussing the need for cyber-security 
provisions in the HSA); see also Statement of Davis, supra note 9, at H5826 (arguing 
that the “vulnerabilities to attack on Federal information systems [have] grown 
exponentially,” and that the “high degree of dependence between information 
systems . . . exposes the Federal Government’s computer networks to benign and 
destructive disruptions”). 
 135. See discussion supra Part II.C (describing how Attorney General Ashcroft 
contributed to the Bush Administration’s FOIA policy); see also Tom Beierle & Ruth 
Greenspan Bell, Don’t Let ‘Right to Know’ be a War Casualty, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Dec. 20, 2001, at 9; see Parker, supra note 3 (quoting Gary Bass, executive director of 
OMB Watch, as stating that “[w]e seem to be shifting to the public’s need to know 
instead of the public’s right to know”).  Analysts believe that the Bush 
Administration’s clampdown on government disclosure “stands out in part because it 
follows a decade in which . . . improving technology [made] government more 
accessible to Americans.”  Id.  One may naturally draw the conclusion that such an 
environment reinforced the public’s “right to know” certain government 
information. 
 136. See GAO, supra note 22, at 4 (explaining how the enactment of FOIA, with its 
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could give agencies a green light to restrict access to government 
information—a result that could ultimately diminish the American 
public’s legal right of free and open access to government 
information.137 
 Further, Attorney General Ashcroft guarantees that DOJ will 
defend agency actions so long as it finds a “sound legal basis” for the 
agency’s reasoning.138  In turn, this could overwhelm the federal court 
system if the public feels it has not been afforded an appropriate 
administrative remedy.139  DOJ officials argue that Attorney General 
Reno’s FOIA memorandum “raised the bar for FOIA refusals,” and 
that Attorney General Ashcroft’s FOIA memorandum simply reverts 
to the standard that had existed prior to the Clinton 
Administration.140  Regardless, this new standard for litigating FOIA 
cases in light of heightened threats to national security could indicate 
that the DOJ is “less committed to open government” post-September 
11, 2001.141 
                                                          
“right to know” standard, supplanted the previous “need to know” basis governing 
access to government information). 
 137. See Summerill, supra note 37, at 28 (arguing that “[c]itizens of a democratic 
society deserve disclosure of government records to ensure government 
accountability”); see also Gidiere & Forrester, supra note 2, at 141 (arguing that the 
Ashcroft Memo’s “‘sound legal basis’ standard is much more slanted toward 
withholding” government records from FOIA disclosure than the Reno Memo’s 
“foreseeable harm” standard). 
 138. Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 60. 
 139. See Vanessa Blum, Administration Won One FOIA Fight, But Battle is Far From 
Over, THE RECORDER, Dec. 16, 2002 (reporting on FOIA challenges in our nation’s 
courtrooms and quoting Natural Resources Defense Council general counsel Sharon 
Buccino as saying  that “the White House is not off the hook” when it comes to FOIA 
disclosures).  Another industry insider, Georgetown University Law Center professor 
and former litigation director of Public Citizen, David Vladeck, commented that DOJ 
was ordered by the White House “to litigate these cases aggressively” and that the 
new battle for information in the courtrooms is “absolute trench warfare.”  Id. 
 140. Id. (reporting a joke by David Sobel, general counsel of the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, that “even under Reno, he never had a case in which the Justice 
Department refused to represent an agency”).  But see James V. Grimaldi, At Justice, 
Freedom Not to Release Information, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2002, at E01 (arguing that “[i]t 
is not that the Reno Justice Department was particularly enamored with FOIA.  But at 
least attorneys didn’t have carte blanche to disregard the law.”). 
 141. See Rotenberg, supra note 9, at 1124 (citing Beierle & Bell, supra note 135, at 
9; On the Public’s Right to Know:  The Day Ashcroft Censored Freedom of Information, S.F. 
CHRON., Jan. 6, 2002, at D4; Ashcroft sends chilling message to FOIA:  Memo urging caution 
over freedom of information requests needs to be reviewed, VENTURA CITY STAR, Jan. 11, 2002, 
at B6; and Helen Thomas, President Bush and John Ashcroft Trample the Bill of Rights, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 16, 2001, at B6); see also Department of Justice 
Oversight:  Preserving our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism, Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 310-14 (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, U.S. 
Attorney General) (outlining the Bush Administration’s tactics in fighting terrorism 
and defending the Administration’s decision to keep confidential information that 
might impede the government’s national security efforts), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2001/1206transcriptsenatejudiciarycommittee.
htm (on file with the American University Law Review); Beierle & Bell, supra note 
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 The Bush Administration memoranda encouraged the protection 
of sensitive information through use of FOIA’s statutory 
exemptions.142  Although the ultimate result of the Ashcroft and Card 
memoranda appears to be a reduction in the amount of government 
information available to the public,143 the memoranda are important 
because they suggested ways to work within FOIA’s preexisting 
statutory framework, using Exemptions 2144 and 4145 to protect 
sensitive information.146  Despite efforts to encourage the protection 
of sensitive information using this framework, private industry 
remains reluctant to share sensitive information with the 
government.  Many critical infrastructure owners and operators 
believe the preexisting FOIA exemptions do not provide adequate 
disclosure protections and could open industry to potential liability. 
                                                          
135, at 9 (asserting that the presumption in the Bush Administration is that 
information is inherently risky). 
 142. See Kimberly Memorandum, supra note 69 (instructing agencies to protect 
sensitive critical infrastructure information under Exemption 2 (5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(2)), and to protect private sector information voluntarily submitted to the 
Government under Exemption 4 (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4))). 
 143. See Tapscott, supra note 64 (reporting that the Pentagon removed 
approximately 6,000 Department of Defense documents from disclosure in 
compliance with the Card Memorandum, and lamenting that now no one “outside of 
government can verify that any of those documents contained information that could 
help terrorists”); see also PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, ONE YEAR LATER:  
SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE INTERNET 8, 9 (2002) (providing an extensive listing of website 
information to which government agencies prevented access post-September 11, 
2001, including the removal of information relating to nuclear facilities from the 
Department of Energy website, the removal of a security report for chemical plants 
from the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry website, and the denial of 
access to the National Pipeline Mapping System on the Department of 
Transportation website), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/ 
PIP_9-11_Report.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).  The Pew 
study reported that the Card and Ashcroft memoranda resulted in the removal of 
documents from government websites, as well as terminating certain websites in their 
entirety.  Id. The Department of Energy completely removed the website for the 
National Transportation of Radioactive Materials from the Internet.  Id. at 9.  A Pew 
survey from June 26, 2002, to July 26, 2002, found that only twenty-five percent of the 
public was aware that the government had sealed off access to some of its sensitive 
websites.  Id. 
 144. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2002) (exempting “internal personnel rules and 
practices of an agency”). 
 145. Id. § 552(b)(4) (exempting “trade secrets and commercial or financial 
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”). 
 146. Similarly, the White House’s National Strategy for Homeland Security also 
provides a framework for working within the preexisting exemption framework to 
address national security concerns.  See NSHS, supra note 10, at 56 (citing FOIA’s 
exemption framework as protecting sensitive information when its disclosure could 
harm the public interest or frustrate national security efforts).  The document 
advocates “narrowly limiting public disclosure” of sensitive information so as not to 
compromise principles of transparency and government accountability.  Id. at 48. 
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B. Private Industry is Reluctant to Enter Into Public-Private Information 
Sharing Partnerships Without Protections to Ensure the Integrity of its 
Sensitive Business Data 
 Private industry faces a significant challenge in protecting its assets 
from attack.147  The government neither owns nor operates the 
majority of the nation’s critical infrastructure.  As a result, private 
industry must provide the first line of defense to protect its own 
systems.148  This entails increased investments in security spending.149  
Complicating this task, industry is also in the midst of coping with the 
consequences of an economic downturn.150  Some critical 
infrastructure owners and operators are now forced to focus on 
remaining in business.  Protecting their companies from potential 
terrorist attacks may be a secondary priority.151 
 While private industry struggles to stay in business, the government 
seeks cooperation to fortify protection of the nation’s critical 
infrastructures.152  Industry could benefit from this interaction:  in 
exchange for providing information to the government concerning 
infrastructure vulnerabilities, the government could provide industry 
with advice in making security investment decisions, assistance if the 
“threat at hand exceeds [industry’s] capability to protect itself,” and 
“timely warning” and assurances that the government would focus on 
the protection of those infrastructures that face a “specific, imminent 
threat.”153 
                                                          
 147. See generally NSPPCIKA, supra note 6 (describing the financing and high 
degree of effort industry must put forth in order to protect its infrastructures). 
 148. Id.  In many cases, private firms possess better technical expertise and more 
adequate means to protect “the infrastructure they control” than the government.  
NSHS, supra note 10, at 33.  Still, industry faces many challenges in this new threat 
environment.  See NSPPCIKA, supra note 6, at 8 (arguing that although critical 
infrastructure owners and operators have always been responsible for protecting 
their systems, this framework was not designed to cope with significant terrorist 
threats or the ensuing economic or psychological fallout). 
 149. Id. at 20. 
 150. Id. at 22. 
 151. Id.  Supporting this assertion, the Brookings Institution argues that private 
markets do not adequately protect against terrorist attacks because businesspersons 
tend to focus more on the pursuit of profit than the possibility that their facilities 
could come under attack.  THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, PROTECTING THE AMERICAN 
HOMELAND:  ONE YEAR ON 80-82 (2003). 
 152. See THE PRESIDENT’S NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE, THE NSTAC’S RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL PLAN  (2001) [hereinafter 
NSTAC RESPONSE] (reporting that while the government focuses on shoring up 
national security, private infrastructure owners and operators focus more on 
“common business imperatives”), available at http://www.ncs.gov/NSTAC/National 
PlanReport-Final.htm (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 153. NSPPCIKA, supra note 6, at xi. 
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 Despite these potential benefits, industry is still reluctant to share 
sensitive business information with the government due to concerns 
that FOIA requests could lead to public disclosure of those 
communications, opening up the possibility of antitrust and other 
potential liability.154  Overall, private industry articulates two major 
concerns about communicating vulnerabilities to the federal 
government:  first, a risk that this information would become public 
through the country’s disclosure laws, resulting in a loss of 
proprietary information and an increased liability, and second, the 
potential for antitrust and other legal action against cooperating 
companies.155 
 Industry insiders argue that “information sharing is a risky 
proposition with less than clear benefits.”156  Purported uncertainty 
about current disclosure laws leads companies to avoid the potential 
risk that such sensitive information could ultimately become public 
through FOIA and similar state statutes.157  Industry groups thus 
                                                          
 154. See NSHS, supra note 10, at 33.  See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
INFORMATION SHARING:  PRACTICES THAT CAN BENEFIT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION 7 (2001) [hereinafter GAO IS] (detailing industry’s concerns that 
release of this type of sensitive information could have damaging effects including 
lowering customer confidence and providing advantages to competitors). 
 155. See Frye, supra note 123, at 361 (reporting that at least two major industry 
organizations, the Information Technology Association of America and the 
Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security, have raised these concerns).  John 
Tritak, Director of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office within the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, testified that industry has long voiced these concerns, 
and that industry’s uncertainty regarding FOIA’s legal framework is a “key 
impediment” to information sharing.  Securing Our Infrastructure:  Private/Public 
Information Sharing:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 
79 (2002) (statement of John S. Tritak, Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance 
Office, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce) [hereinafter Statement of Tritak]. 
 156. See Securing Our Infrastructure:  Private/Public Information Sharing:  Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 97-98 (2002) (statement of Harris 
N. Miller, President, Information Technology Association of America) [hereinafter 
Statement of Miller] (elaborating that no company would want sensitive, and 
potentially damaging, information to be made public—especially when it could 
“jeopardize [that company’s] market position” and investor confidence); see also 
Dorobek, supra note 100, at 12 (discussing industry’s continued hesitance regarding 
FOIA).  Stanley Jarocki, Chairman of a Financial Services Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center and Vice President of Information Technology Security for Morgan 
Stanley, commented that many companies are wary of the risks of sharing this type of 
critical information. Id.  Ronald Dick, director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s National Infrastructure Protection Center, asserted that industry 
believes that the law on FOIA exemptions is unclear.  Id.  In contrast, Representative 
Janice Schakowsky, ranking member of the House Government Reform Committee’s 
Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations 
Subcommittee, finds it “shocking” that industry would be reluctant to share 
information that could prove critical for homeland security.  Id.  Representative 
Schakowsky argued that Congress should not keep this information secret simply 
because businesses prefer that result.  Id. 
 157. Statement of Miller, supra note 156; see also Statement of Tritak, supra note 
155 (arguing that so long as companies perceive the potential for FOIA disclosure of 
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argue that FOIA disclosures must be restricted to ensure the free flow 
of information to the government without fear of reprisal or public 
scrutiny.158  Industry insiders point to antitrust concerns as another 
legal obstacle to information sharing, because “[t]he antitrust laws 
focus on sharing information concerning commercial activities,”159 
which could be implicated by public-private cooperation. 
 With these concerns in mind, the CIIA FOIA provision responds to 
the fear that critical infrastructure owners and operators would not 
comply voluntarily with the government’s information requests 
without new disclosure protections.160  Moreover, the CIIA FOIA 
provision addresses industry’s other liability concerns by providing 
for the legal immunity of infrastructure owners and operators who 
voluntarily provide infrastructure data, and by imposing criminal 
penalties upon those government officials who disclose this 
information.161  Although it remains to be seen whether industry will 
view these new protections as an incentive to share sensitive 
information with the government, current FOIA law indicates that 
the preexisting exemption framework already protects from 
disclosure this type of critical infrastructure information. 
C. The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 Contains an Overly 
Broad and Unnecessary FOIA Exemption  
 Industry’s concerns about public disclosure of sensitive 
information162 seem credible initially because FOIA is a disclosure 
                                                          
sensitive documents, a “common sense risk assessment” leans toward nondisclosure).  
Scott Charney, Chief Security Strategist for Microsoft Corp., argued that many 
companies feel the preexisting exemption framework provided “hazy definitions,” 
and could perhaps lead to “endless litigation.”  Krebs, supra note 103.  Charney made 
this argument in support of a broad, concrete FOIA exemption for the DHS.  Id.  See 
generally THE PRESIDENT’S NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE, INFORMATION SHARING/CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION TASK 
FORCE REPORT C-1–C-17 (2000) [hereinafter NSTAC TASK FORCE REPORT] (analyzing 
industry perspectives on FOIA and listing different information sharing initiatives’ 
potential exposure to disclosure laws), available at http://www.ncs.gov/NSTAC/NST 
ACXXIII/Reports/ISCIP-Final.pdf (on file with the American University Law 
Review).  
 158. GAO IS, supra note 154, at 16; Samuelsohn, supra note 105; see Statement of 
Miller, supra note 156 (contending that the government unfairly expects private 
industry to share sensitive information without any “ironclad assurances of 
confidentiality”). 
 159. Statement of Miller, supra note 156; see Statement of Tritak, supra note 155. 
 160. Additionally, official government sources, such as the White House’s National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, declare that private firms should be assured that “good 
faith disclosures about vulnerabilities and preparedness do not expose the firm to 
liability . . . .”  NSHS, supra note 10, at 33. 
 161. Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong.  §§ 214(a)(1)(C), (f) 
(2002). 
 162. See, e.g., Statement of Copeland, supra note 130 (pinpointing uncertainty and 
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law.163  Courts hold that FOIA should be “broadly construed in favor 
of disclosure,” and that the nine statutory exemptions should be 
narrowly construed.164  Moreover, FOIA is “generally one-sided [in] 
nature”:  while a requester who is denied access to government 
information may file a complaint in a U.S. District Court to enjoin 
agency disclosure,165 FOIA typically does not allow private entities to 
enjoin an agency from disclosure.166  Although these factors cause 
industry to fear FOIA disclosure of sensitive business information,167 a 
clarification of the law,168 rather than a new blanket exemption that 
broadens the scope of FOIA’s preexisting statutory exemptions, 
should quiet industry’s concerns. 
1. The CIIA FOIA exemption expands the breadth of preexisting 
statutory exemptions that already protect infrastructure data 
 FOIA’s preexisting exemption framework protects adequately the 
integrity of sensitive data.169  Specifically, four of the statutory 
exemptions already in place could protect against the release of 
critical infrastructure information:170  1. Classified Information;171 
                                                          
high levels of risk as reasons why industry is reluctant to voluntarily share critical 
infrastructure information with the government, and arguing that “corporations 
should not be required to accept such risks . . . in an attempt to protect the public 
interest”). 
 163. Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 10 (citing Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users 
Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 7 (2001)); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., 861 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that disclosure under FOIA is the rule 
and secrecy is the exception). 
 164. See Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 10 (citing Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1990), and Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. 
Block, 755 F.2d 397, 398 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
 165. Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 11 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)). 
 166. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 
(1979)).  However, an exception may apply to information falling under Exemption 
4.  See discussion infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing “reverse-FOIA” suits). 
 167. See Statement of Kallstrom, supra note 10 (arguing that the private sector 
refuses to share sensitive information with the government because of “well-founded 
fears” that it will ultimately be disclosed under FOIA).  But see Stohs, supra note 132, 
¶ 14 (arguing that private sector fears are overstated and that industry’s concerns 
should not bar disclosure of critical infrastructure information). 
 168. See Statement of Tritak, supra note 155 (arguing that industry must be 
presented with “clear, well-defined rules,” and that the absence of such a clarification 
could place our nation at risk). 
 169. See generally Gidiere & Forrester, supra note 2 (providing evidence that 
exemptions 1 through 4 could protect adequately sensitive critical infrastructure 
data).  The Gidiere & Forrester article was one of the first post-September 11, 2001 
efforts to assess the possibility of safeguarding sensitive national security information 
under FOIA’s preexisting exemption framework. 
 170. See id. at 139 (arguing that there are ways to work within the confines of the 
current exemptions to address recent security concerns). 
 171. Id. at 141.  “Exemption 1 protects information classified pursuant to an 
applicable executive order.”  Id. 
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2.  Internal Agency Procedures;172 3. Information Exempted by 
Statute;173 and 4. Confidential Business Information.174  Of these four 
exemptions, Exemptions 1 and 4 would appear to be the most 
effective preexisting exemptions to secure the integrity of critical 
infrastructure data.  Used in conjunction, these exemptions should 
provide the courts with tools to protect sensitive infrastructure 
information, thus eliminating the need for the broad new DHS 
exemption. 
 Exemption 1, the “oldest and most well-established ground for 
withholding government information,”175 provides for the protection 
of documents that are “specifically authorized under criteria 
established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of 
national defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified 
pursuant to such Executive Order.”176  Courts rely heavily upon an 
                                                          
 172. Exemption 2 “applies to information ‘related solely to the internal personnel 
rules and practices of an agency.’”  Id. at 142 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2002)).  
In the wake of September 11, 2001, DOJ’s Office of Information and Privacy 
supported agency use of this exemption to protect critical infrastructure 
information.  See id. at 143 (arguing that while this exemption could be used to justify 
withholding homeland security information that originated within the agencies, it 
may not protect records submitted “by a private entity regarding nonagency assets”). 
 173. “Exemption 3 protects information ‘specifically exempted from disclosure by 
statute . . . provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from 
the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes 
particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be 
withheld.’”  See id. at 145 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) and reporting that the Critical 
Infrastructure Information Security Act of 2001, S. 1456, was a Senate “attempt to use 
Exemption 3 to protect certain homeland security information”). 
 174. “Exemption 4 of FOIA exempts from disclosure ‘trade secrets and 
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential.’”  See Gidiere & Forrester, supra note 2, at 143 (citing 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(4) and arguing that Exemption 4 appears to protect critical infrastructure 
information submitted by private industry regarding vulnerabilities).  Gidiere and 
Forrester base their analysis on cases that find that information voluntarily submitted 
to the government would receive Exemption 4 protection if it is the type of 
information that “would customarily not be released to the public by the person 
from whom it was obtained.”  Id. (citing Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 
F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).  Gidiere and Forrester reason that information that 
is voluntarily submitted “is not the type of information that would be ‘customarily 
released’ by the business.”  Id. at 143.  Importantly, this standard for voluntarily 
submitted business information has not been adopted by all federal circuits.  Id.  It 
appears that by enforcing this standard, courts would eliminate the need for the 
broad DHS exemption to protect private industry.  See id. at 145 (arguing that 
perhaps the federal circuits should adopt the Critical Mass test for voluntarily 
submitted business information in order to clarify the law protecting “certain 
homeland security information”). 
 175. See Faust, supra note 21, at 617 (citing 1 J. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION 
DISCLOSURE 4-11, 11-1 (1983)).  Incidentally, FOIA supporters often criticize the use 
of Exemption 1 to restrict public access to such a magnitude of data.  See id. at 617 
(citing O’Reilly, supra note 175, at 11-2). 
 176. A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, supra note 33, at 64. 
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agency’s affidavit concerning its Exemption 1 classifications.177  As a 
result, FOIA litigation rarely results in judicial compulsion to disclose 
classified records.178  Therefore, the use of Exemption 1 should 
protect from disclosure classified records pertaining to critical 
infrastructure.179 
 Cases suggest that Exemption 4, which applies to “‘trade secrets’ 
and to ‘commercial or financial information obtained from a person 
and privileged or confidential,’”180 already protects critical 
infrastructure information.181  In Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission,182 the D.C. Circuit held that the purpose of 
Exemption 4 is to encourage cooperation between the government 
and companies with useful information.183  This purpose is the same 
goal as the FOIA provision in the CIIA.184  Indeed, agencies safeguard 
the confidentiality of critical infrastructure information using 
Exemption 4,185 including power plant safety reports186 and design 
drawings of airplane parts.187  Exemption 4 even contains a unique 
provision to protect companies against agency release of information:  
private companies submitting sensitive information to the 
government can bring a “reverse-FOIA” suit seeking to enjoin 
disclosure under the Administrative Procedure Act.188  This power 
could provide industry the sense of security it needs to share its 
proprietary records. 
                                                          
 177. Id.  See generally Faust, supra note 21 (emphasizing the need for effective 
judicial review of Exemption 1 withholdings in case agencies make improper 
disclosure decisions). 
 178. See Faust, supra note 21, at 629 (citing 128 CONG. REC. S4211 (daily ed. Apr. 
28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Durenberger)). 
 179. See Gidiere & Forrester, supra note 2, at 141 (arguing that the current 
Executive Order protecting critical infrastructure (Executive Order 12958) would 
likely cover homeland security information, especially when considered in 
conjunction with other exemptions); see also Kimberly, supra note 69 (providing for 
classification of sensitive government information under Executive Order 12958); 
supra note 96 (implementing Executive Order 12958 for DHS). 
 180. A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, supra note 33, at 65. 
 181. Summerill, supra note 37, at 28. 
 182. 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 183. Id. at 878. 
 184. Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 13; see Gidiere & Forrester, supra note 2, at 143 
(describing Exemption 4 as protecting “infrastructure information” voluntarily 
submitted to the government by private industry). 
 185. Statement of Leahy, supra note 89 (referring to the exemption for financial 
or commercial information (Exemption 4) and citing Critical Mass Energy Project v. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
 186. See id. (citing Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 874). 
 187. See id. (citing United Tech. Corp. v. F.A.A., 102 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 188. See Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 12 n.36 (citing the Administrative Procedure Act, 
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2002) which suggests that “agency actions will only be 
overturned if found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with the law”).  
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 Aside from mere redundancy, the CIIA FOIA exemption actually 
goes beyond the scope of the nine statutory exemptions in restricting 
access to government data.  The CIIA’s FOIA language is so broad 
that it could be construed to protect information that would not 
otherwise be exempt from disclosure.189  In a minority opinion, four 
of the nine members of the House Select Committee on Homeland 
Security expressed concerns that the broad definitions of critical 
infrastructure and voluntary submission could cover corporations 
seeking liability protection, such as an energy company hiding 
information about a leak at its nuclear power plant, simply by 
voluntarily submitting infrastructure information to DHS.190  
Administrative law expert Jeffrey S. Lubbers provides one possible 
solution to restrict this overly broad provision:  amend the Act to 
apply to “[i]nformation provided voluntarily by non-Federal entities 
or individuals . . . to the extent that it relates to infrastructure 
vulnerabilities.”191  This would at least follow FOIA legal precedent by 
providing for the segregability192 of information not directly relating 
to critical infrastructure vulnerabilities.193 
 There are other indications that the CIIA FOIA provision actually 
expands the preexisting exemption framework.  First, the new DHS 
                                                          
 189. See Robert Leger, New Congress Threatens Public Records:  A GOP-Controlled 
Legislature May Be Bad News for Open Government, THE QUILL, Dec. 2002, at 5 (arguing 
that due to the Act’s broad definitions of critical infrastructure and voluntary 
submission, DHS will “exempt many more documents than are withheld” currently 
under Exemption 4). 
 190. H.R. REP. NO. 107-609, at 220 (2002).  The House Select Committee on 
Homeland Security minority view advocated for complete removal of the CIIA FOIA 
provision, arguing that any new exemption is unnecessary and represents a retreat 
from openness in government.  Id.  Critics worry that critical infrastructure owners 
and operators “will be able to submit any information to the government regarding 
previous attacks in order to become insulated against civil liability related to those 
attacks.”  See Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 18 (asserting that while the DHS FOIA language 
will encourage public-private partnerships, it will also inhibit the public’s ability to 
use legal action to enforce industry accountability).  In turn, this could decrease 
private preparedness for future terrorist attacks—if industry knows it will be exempt 
from civil liability “by simply submitting information regarding the attack” to DHS, it 
may have “less of an economic incentive to invest in preventing future attacks.”  
Id. ¶ 19. 
 191. Administrative Law, Adjudicatory Issues, and Privacy Ramifications of Creating a 
Department of Homeland Security:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. 
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Jeffrey S. 
Lubbers, Fellow in Law and Government, Washington College of Law) (emphasis 
added) [hereinafter Statement of Lubbers].  This language is very similar to the 
Leahy Compromise text.  See Amendment, supra note 109 (limiting the DHS FOIA 
exemption to records pertaining to “the vulnerability of and threats to critical 
infrastructure”). 
 192. See Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) (holding that agencies 
may disclose nonsecret factual portions of protected records). 
 193. See Statement of Lubbers, supra note 191. 
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exemption supersedes state access laws.194  Congressman Mark Udall, 
who voted in favor of the HSA, cited this provision as part of his 
argument that the CIIA FOIA provision is “unnecessary.”195  
Moreover, the Administration’s encouragement of nondisclosure in 
light of national security concerns could directly contradict 
Congressional intent:  Congress explicitly instructed in FOIA that for 
national security purposes, “only information specifically exempted from 
disclosure as national security information by executive determination may be 
withheld from the public.”196  Also troubling is the CIIA FOIA 
provision allowing for the criminal prosecution of federal employees 
who disclose this voluntarily submitted information.197 Finally, the 
CIIA’s provision for rendering voluntarily submitted information “off 
limits for any government regulatory action or civil lawsuit” expands 
the breadth of the FOIA exemptions further than ever before.198  This 
immunity provision could prove to be harmful to the public interest 
and even endanger public safety. 
2. The CIIA FOIA exemption could harm public safety 
 Although critical infrastructure owners and operators argue that 
they need this exemption to encourage them to share sensitive 
information,199 industry’s concerns must be weighed against the 
operating principles of FOIA and the public’s right to access this 
information.  Not only could the exemption undermine government 
transparency200 by allowing the government to shield information 
                                                          
 194. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 214(a)(1)(E) 
(2002). 
 195. See 148 CONG. REC. E1506-02 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 2002) (statement of Rep. 
Udall) (arguing that the preemption of state access laws is an unnecessary harm 
caused by the CIIA FOIA exemption when the preexisting exemption framework 
“does not require the disclosure of national security information, sensitive law 
enforcement information, or confidential business information”). 
 196. See Schoenhard, supra note 1, at 506 (emphasis added) (citing this possibility 
as an example of how the Bush Administration is unjustly restricting the flow of 
information to the requesting public and arguing that the current security threat 
does not require a new legal regime). 
 197. Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 214(f) (2002); see 
Clift, supra note 116 (citing this provision as an example of how the DHS FOIA 
provision chips away at FOIA and describing the provision as an indication that the 
Republicans “went further than anybody imagined” in eroding FOIA). 
 198. See Leger, supra note 189 (arguing that the provision would expand beyond 
Exemption 4 and cautioning that the ramification is that industry would be allowed 
to “dump information about any mistakes, which would forever be hidden from the 
public”). 
 199. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 200. See Thomas Blanton, The World’s Right to Know, FOREIGN POL’Y, July 1, 2002, at 
50 (arguing that the concept of freedom of information and the attendant result of 
transparency in government has evolved from “a moral indictment of secrecy to a 
tool for market regulation . . . efficient government, and economic . . . growth”).  But 
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from public view, but this legislation could also needlessly risk public 
safety.201  In Congressional debate, Senator Leahy posed the following 
scenario:  if DHS receives information from a biomedical laboratory 
about a security vulnerability and anthrax is released subsequently 
from the laboratory as a result of that vulnerability, DHS would not 
be able to disclose under FOIA information relating to this security 
vulnerability without first securing the laboratory’s consent to release 
the information.202  Moreover, due to the civil immunity guaranteed 
by the CIIA,203 if a company submits information that its factory is 
leaking arsenic into ground water, that information cannot be turned 
over to local health authorities to use in any enforcement 
proceeding, nor could the public access it through FOIA for use in a 
civil tort action.204 
 As enacted, the law could “‘tie the government’s hands’ by 
precluding it from taking civil enforcement action against a company 
by ‘direct use’ of information obtained through critical 
infrastructure” reports.205  Therefore, Senator Leahy argued, the civil 
immunity provided under the CIIA provides industry with a “perfect 
blueprint” to avoid liability by allowing companies to feed damaging 
information into the voluntary disclosure system, thus eliminating the 
possibility for the government or others harmed by the company’s 
actions to use that information against the company.206  This result, 
permissible under the CIIA, could endanger public safety rather than 
                                                          
see Moon, supra note 25, at 1167-68 (arguing that the principle of transparency in 
government is a liberal construction). 
 201. See, e.g., Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11426 (emphasizing that the 
DHS FOIA provision provides a broad FOIA exemption “without making any real 
gains” in national security); Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 4 (arguing that the CIIA FOIA 
exemption could threaten public access to vital public health and safety 
information); Krebs, supra note 103 (quoting James X. Dempsey, deputy director for 
the Center for Democracy and Technology, as arguing that private industry could 
“shield vital health and safety information from the public, even if disclosure of the 
information would pose no threat whatsoever”). 
 202. Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11425. 
 203. Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 214(a)(1)(C) 
(2002). 
 204. Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11425.  For an elaborate set of 
hypothetical scenarios illustrating potential consequences of the CIIA FOIA 
exemption, see Steinzor, supra note 93, at 656-58 (discussing the potential 
implications of the CIIA on transportation security, pollution, corporate fraud, and 
various other threat scenarios). 
 205. See Dan Caterinicchia, Sharing Seen as Critical for Security, FED. COMPUTER WK. 
(May 9, 2002) (quoting John Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Attorney General), at 
http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2002/0506/web-crit-05-09-02.asp (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
 206. Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11425; see Caterinicchia, supra note 
205 (quoting John Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, as stating that a 
“company that was knowingly at fault” could “do a ‘document dump’ on the 
government and basically absolve itself of future civil prosecution”). 
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preserve it.  Such a tactic would not require that company to address 
the reported vulnerability.  The ensuing lack of public accountability 
could eliminate industry’s incentives to correct security problems. 207  
Moreover, this tactic could also deprive the public of information on 
how to protect itself from reported hazards. 208 
 The goal of the new exemption is clear:  to encourage private 
industry to share sensitive information with the government in order 
to assist the government in preventing and responding to terrorist 
threats.  Yet the CIIA FOIA provision goes far beyond this goal, 
containing language so broad that it creates the potential for abuse.  
This is an unacceptable result when, in all likelihood, this broad 
exemption will not secure private industry’s cooperation in public-
private information sharing partnerships. 
3. Even with new protections, future prospects of public-private information  
 sharing remain uncertain 
a. Distrust and uncertainty continue to present obstacles to voluntary  
 information sharing 
 Although the Bush Administration aims to foster public-private 
information sharing,209 establishing trusting relationships between the 
public and private sectors remains a difficult task.210  The protections 
                                                          
 207. See Steinzor, supra note 93, at 664.  Steinzor’s article provides an extensive 
analysis of the CIIA’s potential implications for corporate accountability and public 
safety. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See NSHS, supra note 10, at 31 (declaring that the U.S. will facilitate an 
“unprecedented level of cooperation . . . with private industry” in order to reduce the 
nation’s vulnerability to terrorism); see also NSPPCIKA, supra note 6, at vii (stating 
that homeland security is a “shared responsibility” for the federal government, state 
and local governments, and the private sector).  Government and industry officials 
alike agree that public-private information sharing will be necessary to protect the 
homeland.  See, e.g., Statement of Dacey, supra note 125 (arguing that information 
sharing partnerships are necessary for developing approaches to defend against 
cyber attacks); Statement of Miller, supra note 156 (stating that the Information 
Technology Association of America, which represents information technology and 
communications companies, supports the government’s goal of increasing public-
private information sharing); Statement of Tritak, supra note 155, at 77 (arguing that 
“infrastructure assurance can only be achieved by a voluntary public-private 
partnership”); Caterinicchia, supra note 205 (reporting Senator Robert Bennett’s 
statement that because the private sector and government are both targets, “they 
should be talking to each other,” but that industry fears disclosed information could 
be used against them). 
 210. See Critical Infrastructure Protection:  Who’s In Charge?:  Hearing of the S. 
Governmental Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. 23-24 (2001) (statement of Jamie S. 
Gorelick, Vice Chairperson, Fannie Mae) (asserting that there is “a decided lack of 
trust between industry and government”).  Supporting this assertion, the Brookings 
Institution argues that the intersection between the Federal government and the 
private sector poses some of the country’s “most difficult homeland security 
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offered by the CIIA are unlikely to eliminate the many obstacles to 
voluntary information sharing.211  Trust is critical to successful 
partnerships,212 and industry officials argue that it can only be built 
over time.213  Thus, the government faces the challenge of initially 
establishing and maintaining trust relationships as it scrambles to 
shore up national security.214  As it stands, private industry is reluctant 
to confirm security breaches due to “competitive pressure, fear of 
regulations, and simple embarrassment.”215  This makes cooperation a 
difficult endeavor, especially because such partnerships typically form 
only in times of imminent crisis.216 
                                                          
challenges.”  See THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 151, at 8 (calling for new 
public-private partnerships without imposing “undue economic costs” on private 
industry); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION:  COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY CAN DRAW ON YEAR 2000 EXPERIENCES 24 (Oct. 
1999) [hereinafter GAO Y2K] (reporting that the task of establishing public-private 
partnerships poses a significant challenge for critical infrastructure protection). 
 211. See Caterinicchia, supra note 205 (quoting John Tritak, director of the Critical 
Infrastructure Assurance Office, as stating that “[p]eople expect too much of 
legislation to fix a cultural problem”).  Impediments to information sharing include 
a lack of trust between private industry and government and industry’s reluctance to 
share sensitive information due to concerns that public release of that information 
could undermine customer confidence, open the floodgates to litigation, and harm 
business in general.  See GAO IS, supra note 154, at 7; see also discussion supra Part 
IV.B (describing industry’s reluctance to share sensitive information with the 
government and citing industry’s call for increased protections). 
 212. GAO IS, supra note 154, at 7.  Along that vein, Tritak argues that while a 
narrowly crafted FOIA exemption might facilitate information sharing, the critical 
factor is still trust.  See Statement of Tritak, supra note 155, at 77 (arguing that 
achieving trust is “no small challenge”). 
 213. GAO IS, supra note 154, at 2. 
 214. See id. at 14-15 (arguing that the government should take steps to 
institutionalize trust, rather than depend on personal relationships with separate 
industries); see also Statement of Tritak, supra note 155, at 78 (stating that trust in any 
voluntary information sharing relationship “requires a predictable and stable process 
where the outcomes are certain”). 
 215. See Kerber, supra note 117 (discussing disincentives to information sharing, 
while arguing for joint law enforcement and business cooperation in order to protect 
critical infrastructure from would-be hackers and terrorists). 
 216. See id. (quoting John Woodward, Director of Information Warfare at Mitre 
Corp.); see also Statement of Miller, supra note 156, at 95 (reporting that although 
ninety percent of large corporations and government agencies responding to a 2002 
FBI/Computer Security Institute Survey detected computer security breaches 
between May 2001 and May 2002, only forty-four percent were “willing and/or able 
to quantify their financial losses”); House Voting on Homeland Security with FOIA, Privacy 
Provisions, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, July 19, 2002 (quoting Entrust C.E.O. William 
Conner as stating that of the aforementioned ninety percent of private sector 
companies, only thirty-four percent reported cyber attacks to law enforcement); 
Krebs, supra note 103 (explaining that Alan Paller, director of research for the SANS 
Institute, believes that most companies will continue to be reluctant to share 
information on system vulnerabilities with the government, even with the newly-
enacted FOIA exemption, because industry traditionally does not share such sensitive 
critical information unless the recipient party could help solve the problem). 
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 Even with the CIIA FOIA exemption in place, industry must still 
focus its efforts on staying in business.217  To meet the public interest 
goal of public-private cooperation,218 companies would have to use 
their valuable resources to develop proprietary information 
regarding vulnerabilities.219  This appears to be contrary to the 
operational goals of profit-driven organizations, because it will not 
increase short-term profits.220 
 Information sharing between the public and private sectors is both 
laudable and necessary,221 and many believe that a successful strategy 
for homeland security depends on “the ability of all levels of 
government and the private sector to communicate effectively with 
one another.”222  Yet as it stands, the government could find its efforts 
in the CIIA wasted without securing industry’s infrastructure 
disclosures.223  Ineffective collaboration undermines efforts to protect 
                                                          
 217. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing demands on industry to keep its 
companies in business during tough economic times). 
 218. See Caterinicchia, supra note 205 (quoting John Tritak, director of the Critical 
Infrastructure Assurance Office, as stating that “[b]oth government and industry 
realize that sharing information is ‘in the public interest’”). 
 219. Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 20. 
 220. Id. (noting that “such investments may be hard to come by with the current 
economic slowdown”); see, e.g., Frye, supra note 123, at 364 (arguing that because 
“profit motivates all private sector activity; privately operated systems respond to 
market motivators rather than public good”).  For example, if a financial institution 
faces a cyber attack, its profit-driven response should simply be to quickly stop the 
attack:  it would not be “cost-effective for businesses to invest in anything other than 
stopping ‘the problem’ and just getting on with business.”  See id. at 366 (quoting 
DAVID KEYES, JOINT ECON. COMM. OF THE U.S. CONG., SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE:  NEW CHALLENGES, NEW STRATEGIES, 46 (2002), available at http:// 
www.house.gov/jec/security.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).  
Frye cites the notorious 1995 Citibank hacking, in which hackers stole $10 million, as 
the only case in which a bank has acknowledged a computer hacking resulting in 
financial loss.  Frye, supra note 123, n. 99.  Frye concludes that the private sector 
should not be criticized for responding to such “naturally occurring incentives” in a 
free-market economy; rather, the public and private sectors should work together to 
tailor the private sector’s motivations and duties toward meeting the goal of 
“reasonable preparedness and full disclosure.”  Id. at 376; see also THE BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION, supra note 151, at 4 (arguing that “the business of business is business, 
not homeland security” and citing the chemical and trucking industries as examples 
of sectors that have not taken adequate steps on their own to improve security). 
 221. See NSHS, supra note 10, at 55 (describing information as “a vital foundation 
for the homeland security effort”).  The White House’s National Strategy for Homeland 
Security includes as its “National Vision” the goal of building a “national environment 
that enables the sharing of essential homeland security information” that would give 
homeland security officials “complete and common awareness of threats and 
vulnerabilities.”  Id. at 56. 
 222. GAO DHS, supra note 86, at 17; see also NSPPCIKA, supra note 6, at 12 
(asserting that information sharing between the government and private industry is 
necessary to mitigate terrorist threats). 
 223. See Stohs, supra note 132, ¶¶ 4, 20 (arguing that this provision may not “do 
anything to increase public/private collaboration” and that the “biggest roadblock to 
public/private information sharing still remains:  overcoming business interests”); see 
discussion supra Part IV.C.3 (discussing cultural impediments to information sharing, 
UHL.AUTHORCHANGES2MARTINE.A.DOC 2/23/2004  2:22 PM 
300 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:261 
our nation’s critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks.224  One 
alternative to voluntary disclosures is to require information sharing 
between the public and private sectors.225  Such information likely 
would still receive protections under Exemption 4:  information that 
is required to be submitted to the government receives Exemption 4 
protection “if it is of the sort not customarily released,” and if that 
disclosure would either “impair the government’s ability to obtain 
necessary information in the future,” or “cause substantial harm” to 
the submitting party.226  It appears that sensitive critical infrastructure 
data would meet this criterion and thus be afforded Exemption 4 
protection.  In light of our infrastructure vulnerabilities, perhaps 
lawmakers should consider this option.227  Prior public-private 
partnerships provide further options for dealing with the information 
sharing problem. 
b. Lessons From Prior Successful Partnerships Could Provide the 
 Government With a Blueprint to Facilitate Information Sharing 
 The notion of public-private partnerships is not an entirely new 
idea:  the Clinton Administration provided a blueprint for public-
private information sharing on critical infrastructure matters through 
issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (“PDD 63”), entitled 
“Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructures.”228  In light of our 
country’s increased dependence on interconnected infrastructures, 
PDD 63 advocated for the voluntary participation of private industry 
in public-private partnerships as one means of securing sensitive 
sectors.229  In so doing, PDD 63 encouraged private industry to 
establish Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to serve as a 
means of gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information 
                                                          
such as trust, that cannot be legislated by statute). 
 224. GAO DHS, supra note 86, at 17. 
 225. Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 21. 
 226. See id. ¶ 21 & n.48 (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & 
Drug Admin., 185 F.3d 898, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); A Blackletter Statement of 
Administrative Law, supra note 33, at 65-66. 
 227. See Stohs, supra note 132, ¶ 21 (arguing that because Exemption 4 could still 
cover information submitted voluntarily to the government, this option deserves 
discussion). 
 228. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet:  Protecting America’s 
Critical Infrastructures:  PDD 63 [hereinafter PDD 63], at http://www.fas.org/irp/ 
offdocs/pdd-63.htm (May 22, 1998) (on file with the American University Law 
Review).  The White House issued this explanation of PDD 63 because the original 
document is classified. 
 229. Id.; see GAO Y2K, supra note 210, at 5 (declaring that PDD 63 acknowledged 
that public-private cooperation would be necessary in order to evaluate cyber-risks to 
our critical infrastructure). 
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between private infrastructure sectors and the government.230  
Following this blueprint, the Bush Administration’s National Strategy 
for Homeland Security, released on July 16, 2002, assigned certain 
agencies the “primary responsibility for interacting with critical 
infrastructure sectors” in order to facilitate information sharing.231  
For example, under the Bush Administration’s plan, DHS will 
interact with the Information, Telecommunications, and Emergency 
Services sectors, whereas the Department of Health and Human 
Services will interact with the Public Health sector.232 
 One example of successful public-private information sharing is 
the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee 
(“NSTAC”), created in 1982 by Executive Order 12382 (“President’s 
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee”).233  
NSTAC’s industry members provide advice to the federal government 
on national security and emergency preparedness 
telecommunications matters.234  For over twenty years, this advisory 
board has voluntarily advised the country’s leaders on security issues 
regarding the telecommunications and information infrastructure.235  
As such, NSTAC stands as a model for public-private collaboration.236  
As an advisory board, however, NSTAC is not responsible for sharing 
with the government individual members’ infrastructure 
vulnerabilities. 
 Perhaps the best known and most successful endeavors of 
information sharing on system vulnerabilities were the public-private 
partnerships formed between the government and private computer 
network operators in response to the potential Year 2000 (“Y2K”) 
date conversion problem.237  One possible reason why industry 
complied voluntarily with the government’s information requests was 
that Congress enacted a narrowly tailored FOIA provision that 
                                                          
 230. PDD 63, supra note 228; GAO IS, supra note 154, at 6.  In 2001, GAO 
reported that progress in implementing PDD 63 has been slow.  See id. (citing the 
creation of six Information Sharing and Analysis Centers in five industry sectors). 
 231. NSHS, supra note 10, at 31. 
 232. Id. at 32. 
 233. NSTAC RESPONSE, supra note 152, at *14. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Similar to NSTAC, the Treasury Department chairs the Financial and 
Banking Information Infrastructure Committee, which bridges a public-private 
partnership focusing on security issues concerning the financial services industry.  
NSHS, supra note 10, at 31. 
 237. See GAO Y2K, supra note 210, at 3 (summarizing the Y2K challenge as “a 
major test of our nation’s ability to protect its computer-supported critical 
infrastructures”).  See generally NSTAC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 157, at 7-8 
(describing the Y2K disclosure system and arguing that it was a successful example of 
public-private information sharing). 
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exempted such information from public disclosure.238  Also, Y2K 
information sharing was successful in part because private industry 
and the government together “recognized the threat and faced a 
fixed deadline by which time[ly] action had to be taken.”239  This is 
different from sector-wide critical infrastructure protection, where 
industry faces an unclear threat for a potentially infinite duration.240 
 One key lesson from the Y2K success story is that industry’s long-
standing disclosure concerns241 make it reluctant to form information 
sharing partnerships without certain protections.  Thus, in order to 
encourage information sharing, the government should take some 
action to demonstrate the importance it places on protecting 
industry’s sensitive business information.242  Industry was unconvinced 
that FOIA’s preexisting statutory framework protected adequately the 
integrity of critical infrastructure data.243  An official clarification of 
FOIA’s preexisting exemption framework could address these 
concerns.244  However, if the government decides that it needs to 
provide a greater incentive in order to strengthen national security, 
the narrow FOIA exemption proposed by the Senate compromise 
legislation provides a palatable alternative.245  Regardless, the 
                                                          
 238. Public Law 105-271, the “Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure 
Act,” provides that “any Year 2000 statements or other such information provided by 
a party in response to a special Year 2000 data gathering request . . . shall be exempt 
from disclosure under . . . the ‘Freedom of Information Act.’”  Year 2000 
Information and Readiness Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 105-271, § 4(f)(3)(A), 112 
Stat. 2386 (1998).  NSTAC recommends legislation similar to this Act that would 
protect critical infrastructure information voluntarily shared from disclosure under 
FOIA, arguing that none of the preexisting exemptions would cover critical 
infrastructure information.  NSTAC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 157, at 9, 11. 
 239. Id. at 8. 
 240. “Without a clear and present danger, it is difficult for industry to justify 
spending additional dollars” to protect its systems.  Id.  Unlike the Y2K problem and 
its finite end-date, the challenge of securing our nation’s critical infrastructure 
protection continues.  GAO Y2K, supra note 210, at 20.  Similar to Y2K, ongoing 
critical infrastructure protection will require both public and private sector 
involvement.  Id. at 18. 
 241. See discussion supra Part IV.B (citing industry’s liability concerns as 
preventing it from forming public-private partnerships). 
 242. Statement of Tritak, supra note 155.  This assertion is supported by Harris 
Miller, President of the Information Technology Association of America, who 
testified in a Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing that uncertainty has a 
“chilling effect” on information sharing and that government must give private 
industry certainty that its sensitive information would be protected.  Statement of 
Miller, supra note 156, at 98. 
 243. Miller testified that the preexisting FOIA language was not sufficient to 
protect critical infrastructure data from disclosure and advocated for “the 
extraordinary treatment of a complete ban on FOIA disclosure.” Id. at 102. 
 244. See supra note 167 and supporting text (discussing the necessity of a 
clarification of current FOIA law). 
 245. See discussion supra Part III.B (reviewing the compromise legislation’s 
narrower FOIA language and absence of immunity provisions). 
UHL.AUTHORCHANGES2MARTINE.A.DOC 2/23/2004  2:22 PM 
2003] THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 303 
government should pay attention to demands for reform246 and act to 
restrict the CIIA’s overly broad FOIA language.247  
4. The recent erosion of FOIA is a sleeper issue that could shock the public 
 Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the public 
entrusted the government to protect national security and might be 
reluctant to question, or may not even be aware of, the attendant 
reduction of civil liberties.248  The ramifications of the Bush 
Administration’s FOIA guidance, geared toward agencies, were not 
widely reported in the mainstream news media.249  Similarly, the 
controversy surrounding DHS labor rules often eclipsed the CIIA 
FOIA debate on Capitol Hill.250 
 The Bush Administration must not mistake the American public’s 
apparent complacency on this matter as tacit approval of expansion 
of governmental secrecy.  With DHS now serving as the figurehead 
for the nation’s counter-terrorism efforts, expectations of enhanced 
national security fall squarely upon its shoulders.  The public is 
already skeptical about DHS’s ability to safeguard our nation.251  One 
terrorist attack would intensify public scrutiny and raise questions as 
                                                          
 246. See Fix This Loophole, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2003, at A20 (imploring Congress 
to quickly eliminate the overly broad language of the DHS FOIA provision before the 
government and the public find themselves “out of the loop—on important 
regulatory matters”). 
 247. See discussion  supra Part IV.C.1 (reviewing the DHS FOIA provision’s overly 
broad language and arguing that it must be more narrowly tailored so as not to 
create the potential for abuse). 
 248. See Statement of Swire, supra note 89, at 23 (expressing concern that if 
everyone is concerned with short-term gains to homeland security, it is a question 
whether people will voice “long-time concerns about erosions of civil liberties”). 
 249. See Travis Loop, State of the Union’s Press, PRESSTIME, Feb. 2003, at 7 (quoting 
Paul McMasters, First Amendment Ombudsman at the Freedom Forum, as stating 
that editors must be more vigilant in sharing with readers how government access 
laws contribute to the stories they read; otherwise, the public will not fully realize 
how access laws like FOIA affect their daily lives). 
 250. See Leger, supra note 189 (defending the media’s focus on labor rules as 
understandable, because disagreement over that provision led to a Senate stalemate).  
Leger argues that the CIIA FOIA provision “slaps all 281 million Americans” and 
serves as “Exhibit One” that this Administration will “toss favors to business and 
industry.”  Id. 
 251. A Gallup poll from early January 2003 indicated that only thirteen percent of 
Americans feel “a lot” safer with the new DHS; four in ten Americans feel DHS will 
not make the country safer at all.  The State of Our Union:  Speech Shows Growing Gap 
Between Bush Rhetoric and Reality, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 29, 2003; see THE BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION, supra note 151, at 1 (arguing that the new DHS “will not in and of itself 
make Americans safer” and pinpointing problem areas within the Bush 
Administration’s homeland security policies).  In its assessment of security concerns 
post-September 11, 2001, the Brookings Institution highlights concerns facing the 
new DHS, reporting that homeland security proves overwhelming in both its 
complexity and in the number of potential targets.  Id. at 2. 
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to why DHS’s mission failed.252  Chances are DHS will somehow fail, 
because there is no other agency that faces a more difficult task 
involving such high risks.253  The public could be outraged to discover 
that one practical ramification of CIIA FOIA exemption is that the 
public cannot directly hold DHS—its own government—accountable 
for its operations.254 
 Popular distrust of government, fueled by scandal, led to FOIA’s 
enactment and fortification.255  If FOIA’s erosion continues 
unimpeded, an attack on our homeland could ultimately lead to 
demands for reform.256  The public is becoming increasingly aware of 
these new FOIA developments through personal experience in the 
request process, and through new lawsuits. 
D. Current Effects of Post-September 11, 2001 FOIA Restrictions on the 
Requesting Community 
 The immediate effects of the post-September 11, 2001 FOIA 
restrictions on the requesting community are in dispute.257  Agency 
officials characterize the effects on FOIA implementation as relatively 
minor, except for mail delays associated with anthrax in October 
                                                          
 252. See Talkback Live (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 24, 2003) (quoting DHS 
Secretary Tom Ridge as stating that DHS has the “unified mission of protecting 
America”). 
 253. See GAO DHS, supra note 86, at 5 (arguing that “DHS’s national security 
mission is of such importance that the failure to address its management challenges 
and programs risks could have serious consequences on our intergovernmental 
system, our citizens’ health and safety, and our economy”).  If DHS were to fail at 
protecting the homeland, this could result in grave consequences for our nation.  Id. 
at 3.  This challenge is exacerbated by the fact that most of the agencies merged into 
DHS were created for reasons largely unrelated to the nation’s current national 
security concerns.  THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 151, at 15.  As such, DHS 
faces the challenge of managing these disparate groups while focusing on the 
ultimate task of protecting national security.  See id. at 15-16. 
 254. If the past is any predictor, FOIA requests often follow disastrous events and 
even lead to reform.  See, e.g., supra notes 20 and 27 and accompanying text (citing 
the Vietnam War and Watergate as events leading to public outrage and cries for 
reform).  Drawing upon this experience, the public would probably file FOIA 
requests with DHS if any future national security catastrophe occurs. 
 255. See id. (discussing FOIA’s enactment during the Vietnam War and FOIA’s 
strengthening after the Watergate scandal). 
 256. Moreover, such events could damage public officials who support these FOIA 
policies.  Robert Saloschin writes that his FOIA experience taught him that “clinging 
to secrecy in the face of persistent attack, even if legally warranted, can be very 
damaging” to government officials—especially if others believe the secrecy to be 
unwarranted.  Saloschin, supra note 3, at 1407.  Saloschin recalls the Watergate 
scandal, when President Nixon’s withholding of information ultimately led to his 
resignation.  Id. 
 257. See GAO, supra note 22, at 3 (reporting that agency officials and FOIA 
requesters view the impact of September 11, 2001, on access to government 
information differently). 
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2001.258  A recent GAO Report surveyed FOIA officers at various 
agencies and found that most of those officers “did not notice 
changes in their agencies’ responses to FOIA requests compared to 
previous years.” 259  This survey began in October 2002, one year after 
the policy change initiated by the Ashcroft Memorandum and before 
Congress created the new DHS.  As a result, the survey did not take 
into account any data regarding the level of disclosures at DHS, the 
agency most likely to safeguard critical infrastructure information 
due to the authority it received from the CIIA FOIA provision.   
 In contrast, members of the requesting community express general 
concerns about the dissemination of information and access to 
government information in light of the removal of information from 
some government web sites after September 11, 2001.260  Importantly, 
some requesters characterize DOJ’s new policy as “representing a 
shift from a ‘right to know’ to a ‘need to know’261 that could 
discourage the public from making requests.”262  Many Americans are 
also affected by state decisions that follow the Bush Administration’s 
lead in narrowing the scope of FOIA disclosures.263 
 The long-term effects of the post-September 11, 2001 FOIA 
restrictions will not be known for some time.264  “[A]ny effects may 
not be clear until denials of information during this time period are 
appealed, litigated, and decided—a process that could take several 
years.”265  Ultimately, it is simply too soon to determine conclusively 
whether information requests now receive more scrutiny from all 
agencies.266  However, one need only look to the federal courts to find 
judicial responses to the Bush Administration’s new policies. 
                                                          
 258. Id. 
 259. General Accounting Office, Freedom of Information Act:  Agency Views on 
Changes Resulting from New Administration Policy 2 (2003) (reporting that one 
third of the officers surveyed noticed a decreased likelihood of disclosure post-
September 11, 2001 and that seventy-five percent of those officers blamed the new 
Ashcroft policy as the main reason for the change). 
 260. Id.; see also Parker, supra note 3, at 1A (reporting that the government 
removed “hundreds of thousands of public documents” from its websites and that it 
edited other public information); Schoenhard, supra note 1, at 502 (criticizing the 
removal of information from government websites, such as the Department of 
Energy website, after September 11, 2001). 
 261. See Beierle & Bell, supra note 135. 
 262. GAO, supra note 22, at 3; see also Beierle & Bell, supra note 135. 
 263. See Parker, supra note 3 (citing four states’ efforts to restrict disclosure laws). 
 264. GAO, supra note 22. 
 265. Id. at 3. 
 266. Blum, supra note 139. 
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1. Current legal challenges 
 On the litigation front, current FOIA lawsuits could test the judicial 
waters of the Bush Administration’s new nondisclosure policy.267  
David Vladeck, a Georgetown University Law Center professor and 
former litigation director of Public Citizen, commented that FOIA 
results in additional litigation to obtain information that was 
previously obtainable without a lawsuit.268  Moreover, the fact that 
Attorney General Ashcroft has essentially pledged a “more vigorous 
defense” of agency decisions so long as they are premised on a sound 
legal basis could pave the way for more difficult courtroom 
challenges and result in less information being made public.269 
 One FOIA success in the past year resulted from a complaint filed 
by Judicial Watch regarding a purported anthrax cover-up at the 
Washington, D.C. Brentwood mail facility.270  Judicial Watch filed a 
FOIA request with the U.S. Postal Service (“U.S.P.S.”) regarding 
anthrax information.271  When the U.S.P.S. failed to comply with the 
request, Judicial Watch filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia.272  On September 11, 2002, Judge Henry H. 
Kennedy, Jr. ordered the U.S.P.S. to “produce all documents or 
portions thereof which are responsive to Plaintiff’s request.”273  Those 
court-mandated disclosures indicated that U.S.P.S. and U.S. 
government officials knew that envelopes leaked anthrax into the 
facility, but those officials failed to close that facility for four more 
days, after two Brentwood employees died from inhalation anthrax.274  
Based on these FOIA disclosures, Judicial Watch filed a new 
complaint for a criminal investigation with the U.S. Attorney for 
D.C.275 
 Recently, in Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Office of Homeland 
Security,276 the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) filed a 
                                                          
 267. See id. (detailing public interest groups’ continuing attempts to secure 
information under FOIA and reporting the National Resources Defense Counsel 
general counsel Sharon Buccino’s determination to challenge the White House on 
the issue). 
 268. Id. 
 269. See id. (discussing Ashcroft’s FOIA guidance to agencies). 
 270. Judicial Watch is a public interest group that investigates and prosecutes 
government corruption and abuse.  Anthrax Lawsuit, supra note 12. 
 271. See Complaint for Criminal Investigation:  Anthrax Attacks (Dec. 6, 2002) 
(detailing Judicial Watch’s FOIA request), available at http://www.judicialwatch.org/ 
cases/99/brentwoodltr.htm (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See id. (listing information revealed in U.S. Postal Service documents). 
 275. See Anthrax Lawsuit, supra note 12. 
 276. No. 02-620 (D.D.C. Dec. 26, 2002), available at http://www.epic.org/ 
open_gov/homeland/ohs_decision.pdf (on file with the American University Law 
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complaint against OHS requesting OHS to process and release 
records.277  EPIC made a FOIA request on March 20, 2002, requesting 
records relating to OHS’s proposed programs.278  OHS responded 
that it could not be subjected to FOIA requests because it was not an 
agency.279  The District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed 
OHS’s motion for summary judgment and granted EPIC’s discovery 
motion.280 
 The Bush Administration will continue to monitor progress in that 
case, as well as many other unresolved FOIA cases.  Pending litigation 
are cases dealing with the release of names of those detained as part 
of the investigation into the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 
statistics on the Justice Department’s use of new surveillance powers 
authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act, information related to the 
Defense Department’s “Total Information Awareness” initiative, and 
data maintained by U.S. Attorney’s offices indicating how many 
investigations are under way in specific categories, such as terrorism 
or civil rights.281  Although the Judicial Watch and EPIC lawsuits 
demonstrate judicial compulsion of FOIA disclosure despite the Bush 
Administration’s restricted FOIA policy, the broad new CIIA FOIA 
exemption indicates that there still remains an overall climate of 
nondisclosure post-September 11, 2001. 
2. Additional legislation in the current congressional term 
 The CIIA FOIA provision could lead to more debate in the 2003-
2004 congressional term.  Senator Leahy, a long-time FOIA advocate, 
argued that the HSA’s flaws would need to be addressed in this 
congressional term.282  Similarly, Senator Levin declared that he 
would attempt to legislate FOIA during the 108th Congress to clarify 
the exemptions under the Act.283  Indeed, the 108th Congress 
revisited the FOIA issue through the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee’s confirmation hearing of now-DHS Secretary Tom 
                                                          
Review). 
 277. See id. (summarizing EPIC’s request for documents and subsequent 
complaint). 
 278. See id. at **1-2 (quoting EPIC’s request for information on OHS plans to 
implement a national system for driver’s licenses and to use biometric technology for 
information purposes). 
 279. See id.  at *2 (arguing that the court should dismiss the case for lack of 
jurisdiction over OHS, a non-agency).  FOIA only applies to agency records.  See 
supra note 33 and supporting text (defining agency records for FOIA purposes). 
 280. Elec. Privacy Info. Center, No. 02-620, at *1. 
 281. See Blum, supra note 139 (detailing public interest groups’ use of FOIA to 
compel a reluctant administration to release information). 
 282. See Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11423. 
 283. See Samuelsohn, supra note 83. 
UHL.AUTHORCHANGES2MARTINE.A.DOC 2/23/2004  2:22 PM 
308 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:261 
Ridge.284  In the hearing, Senator Levin focused on the CIIA’s 
authorization of criminal penalties for those who disclose protected 
sensitive information.285  Senator Levin argued for the need to repair 
the underlying legislation because its criminal penalty and legal 
immunity provisions could eventually lead companies to protect 
themselves from legal actions simply by providing infrastructure 
information to the DHS.286  Building on that argument, Senator 
Durbin questioned Secretary Ridge on whether he was aware that the 
resulting legal immunity would severely limit ordinary citizens’ 
opportunity for legal redress.287  Secretary Ridge expressed concern 
about differing interpretations of the statute and stated that he would 
work with the Senators to clarify the CIIA FOIA language.288   
 Fulfilling the promise to keep the FOIA fight alive in the Senate, 
Senators Leahy, Levin, Jeffords, Lieberman and Byrd recently 
proposed new legislation to chisel away the broad barrier to 
disclosure under the CIIA.  Their bill, the Restoration of Freedom of 
Information Act of 2003,289 (“Restore FOIA Act”) follows closely the 
Senate compromise legislation that Senators Leahy, Bennett and 
Levin advanced in Fall 2002.   Like the compromise legislation, this 
measure would limit the CIIA FOIA exemption to “records” 
submitted by private entities, a much narrower standard than the 
provision for “information” contained in the CIIA. 290  The bill would 
                                                          
 284. See generally Hearing on the Nomination of Honorable Thomas “Tom” J. Ridge to be 
Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Security Before the S. Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 108th 
Cong. (2003). 
 285. See Hearing on the Nomination of Honorable Thomas “Tom” J. Ridge to be Sec’y of the 
Dep’t of Homeland Security Before the Senate Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 
37 (2003) (statement of Sen. Levin, Member, Senate Governmental Affairs Comm.) 
[hereinafter Statement of Levin] (asserting that the language in the bill regarding 
unclassified information is too broad because, as written, it might prevent disclosure 
of information for fear of criminal prosecution); see also Hearing on the Nomination of 
Honorable Thomas “Tom” J. Ridge to be Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Security Before the 
Senate Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 41 (2003) (statement of Sen. 
Durbin, Member, Senate Governmental Affairs Comm.) [hereinafter Statement of 
Durbin]. 
 286. See Statement of Levin, supra note 285, at 37 (describing this opportunity as a 
“security blanket” for the companies). 
 287. See Statement of Durbin, supra note 285, at 41 (arguing that he understands 
the need to protect sensitive information, but that the CIIA exceeded that by 
rendering companies immune from litigation merely by making disclosures to the 
DHS). 
 288. See Hearing on the Nomination of Honorable Thomas “Tom” J. Ridge to be Sec’y of the 
Dep’t of Homeland Security Before the Senate Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 
37, 41 (2003) (statement of Tom Ridge, Nominated to be Secretary of Homeland 
Security) (arguing that it was not the intent of those who crafted the CIIA FOIA 
exemption to protect wrongdoers, and that setting up the DHS’ information analysis 
and infrastructure protection unit would be one of his initial tasks). 
 289. S. 609, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 290. Whereas records “refer to physical and well-defined communications,” such 
UHL.AUTHORCHANGES2MARTINE.A.DOC 2/23/2004  2:22 PM 
2003] THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 309 
restrict the CIIA FOIA exemption to records pertaining to “the 
vulnerability of and threats to critical infrastructure (such as attacks, 
response and recovery efforts),” 291 whereas the current CIIA FOIA 
exemption applies to any “critical infrastructure information.”  In 
contrast to the CIIA’s broad prohibition against disclosure, including 
criminal penalties against any government employee who releases 
that information for any reason, the Restore FOIA Act eschews 
criminal penalties and would not forbid the use of these records in 
civil court cases in order to hold companies accountable for their 
wrongdoing or to protect the public. 292  The bill was referred to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee in March 2003 and awaits further 
consideration. 
 With continuous lawsuits to compel the release of FOIA 
information by the Bush Administration, as well as efforts to narrow 
the broad CIIA FOIA language in this congressional term, a clear 
exposition of the public’s rights under FOIA in our country is far 
from complete. 
CONCLUSION 
 FOIA is a critical component of our democratic government and 
should be protected even in times of heightened concerns about 
national security.293  Implemented in 1966, FOIA survived the 
national security crises of the Cold War without imposing severe 
restrictions on the dissemination of government information.  
Governmental transparency and homeland security are not 
inconsistent goals.  Preexisting statutory exemptions, in particular the 
first and fourth exemptions, provide broad protection of sensitive 
information, even after September 11, 2001.294 
 Present and future efforts to erode FOIA will harm requesters who 
                                                          
as documents and reports, “information” is a more expansive, undefined term and 
could encompass telephone calls, conversations, or other non-traditional 
communications.  See U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Side-by-Side Analysis of the Leahy-
Levin-Jeffords-Lieberman-Byrd Restoration of Freedom of Information Act of 2003 and the 
Critical Infrastructure Information Subtitle of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, at 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200303/031203a.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003) (on 
file with the American University Law Review).   
 291. S. 609, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003). 
 292. See generally id. 
 293. See Clinton Memorandum, supra note 52 (arguing that because citizens in a 
democratic government must have access to information, agencies should renew 
their commitment to FOIA, an important means by which to disseminate 
information). 
 294. See Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11423 (explaining that current 
FOIA exemptions balance public safety and national security with open disclosure of 
government information). 
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are entitled to most of the information they seek.295  With the broad 
new CIIA FOIA exemption and a DOJ that will vigorously defend 
almost all agency FOIA decisions, the time period for responding to 
the requesting public could expand greatly, especially in light of 
preexisting backlogs and the amount of time it could take for 
administrative appeals and further litigation. 
 The significance of September 11, 2001 and its impact on the 
freedom of information cannot be ignored—it has affected the 
perception of privacy, congressional lawmaking, and perhaps even 
court decisions.296  But this does not justify the expansion of 
governmental secrecy post-September 11, 2001.297  One would be 
hard-pressed to find a spokesperson for the notion that even sensitive 
information should flow unimpeded to the public in the name of 
governmental transparency.298  We all want to keep our country 
secure and our people safe, but the exemption framework codified at 
5 U.S.C. § 552 protects adequately against the release of sensitive data 
that could place the U.S. at risk.299 
                                                          
 295. See GAO, supra note 22, at 57 (discussing the potential “chilling effect” of the 
FOIA policy change under the Bush Administration); see also Statement of Swire, 
supra note 89 (arguing that the DHS FOIA provision should have been deleted from 
the Act because the provision permits the DHS to secret information it receives, even 
if the information is otherwise available through FOIA requests). 
 296. See generally Rotenberg, supra note 9, at 1115 (examining the relationship 
between privacy and secrecy and the events of September 11, 2001).  After the 
horrific events of September 11, 2001, “[r]egulation changes that most would have 
opposed or thought impractical and overbearing before September 11 will be 
welcomed.”  Vartanian, supra note 101, at *2; see also Robin Toner, Some Foresee A Sea 
Change In Attitudes On Freedoms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001 (discussing congressional 
attitudes towards civil liberties in the wake of the September 11 tragedy), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/15/national/15CIVI.html (on file with the 
American University Law Review).  But see Beierle & Bell, supra note 135 (citing a 
N.Y. TIMES/CBS poll from December 2001 demonstrating public concern that FOIA 
will impede on core civil liberties). 
 297. See Rotenberg, supra note 9, at 1123-25 (arguing that the expansion in 
government secrecy post-September 11, 2001 appears to be growing unimpeded with 
the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act (Pub. L. No. 107-56) and closed hearings, 
in conjunction with limited access to public records under FOIA). 
 298. See Tapscott, supra note 64 (asserting that although the Bush Administration’s 
efforts address legitimate national security issues in the war against terrorism, no one 
has produced an example of sensitive information that could not have been 
exempted from disclosure under FOIA’s preexisting statutory exemptions); see also 
Parker, supra note 3 (arguing that withholding information about certain sensitive 
infrastructure sectors, including nuclear power plants, pipeline routes, chemical 
supplies, and the airlines seems appropriate for national security purposes). 
 299. See Statement of Leahy, supra note 89, at S11423 (arguing that encouraging 
information sharing between the public and private sectors is a laudable goal 
supported by Congress but that the FOIA exemption provided by the CIIA is an 
inappropriate way to meet this goal). 
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 Those who believe that the overly broad cession of the public’s 
right to know is necessary in this “war against terrorism”300 should 
recall the remarks of a certain Republican congressman from Illinois: 
[D]isclosure of government information is particularly important 
today because government is becoming involved in more and more 
aspects of every citizen’s personal and business life, and so access to 
information about how government is exercising its trust becomes 
increasingly important.301 
 Donald Rumsfeld made this statement in support of FOIA in 
turbulent 1966.  Now the Bush Administration’s Secretary of Defense, 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s words ring true in this era of increased 
government secrecy, when governmental transparency appears to 
have become a casualty of war.302  Only time will reveal the effects of 
these new restrictions on the public’s right to government 
information.  As long as the Bush Administration and Congress 
refuse to work within the adequate preexisting FOIA framework to 
address national security concerns, the prospects for governmental 
transparency in this new era appear grim. 
                                                          
 300. See Tapscott, supra note 64 (reporting surveys indicating that Americans may 
be willing to trade civil liberties for security against terrorism).  But see Parker, supra 
note 3 (decrying congressional silence in light of the Bush Administration’s secrecy 
efforts and reporting that critics argue that the Administration’s clampdown on 
disclosure is opportunistic). 
 301. Tapscott, supra note 64. 
 302. See Beierle & Bell, supra note 135. 
